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ABSTRACT
This thesis was prepared to further understanding of the
influence of secondary mortgage markets on residential mortgage
lending practices and the availability of mortgage credit for
affordable housing options in the City of Boston. The study is
empirically based upon the experience of the Massachusetts
Housing Partnership's Homeownership Opportunity Program (HOP) and
the characteristics of Boston's potential first-time moderate
income homebuyers.
The study consists of three primary elements. Surveys of
developers who have initiated or completed Boston HOP projects
detail the extent to which secondary markets influence the
affordability and mortgagability of community based
public/private sponsored homeownership projects. The formation
and growth of secondary mortgage markets, standardization of
underwriting guidelines and the appropriateness of these
guidelines in the Boston context are then discussed through a
combination of secondary literature reviews and current
professional opinion on the subject. Finally, the potential
costs and benefits of several alternative underwriting
initiatives are compared to additional financing and home price
subsidies as a means of improving affordability and furthering
community development goals.
This thesis will be of interest to community based organizations,
public interest research groups, mortgage lenders, and state and
local public officials who share a concern about the financing
and development of affordable homeownership opportunities.
Secondary mortgage markets will continue to play an increasingly
important role in determining access to mortgage credit among
first time homebuyers. By endogenizing these factors of
affordability into the housing production planning process,developers and public sponsors will be better able to cope with
the restrictions of secondary markets, and better prepared to
negotiate for more flexible, regionally appropriate underwriting
guidelines.
Executive Summary
While residential mortgage underwriting guidelines and
lending risk have traditionally been the concern of bankers and
actuaries, several trends in the mortgage lending environment and
local housing markets have made this subject a matter of more
general public interest among affordable housing advocates today.
This study was undertaken to further understanding of recent
trends which 1) have given rise to nationally oriented mortgage
markets and 2) have increasingly tightened underwriting
standards in ways that restrict access to mortgage credit for
many moderate income first time buyers in Boston neighborhoods.
Perhaps most illustrative of the degree to which these
changes in the lending environment impact access to housing
credit among first-time buyers is the case of the Massachusett's
Housing Partnership's Homeownership Opportunity Program (HOP).
Units produced under the program and designed for households with
incomes under $32,500 sit empty months after construction
completion, despite the dire need for more affordable housing in
Boston. While interest in the units was high among targetted
buyers (with as many as 800 applicants for a 40 unit project), a
substantial number of applicants were eliminated because they
could not fit into the initial screening "matrix" of
underwriting standards, or were later disqualified on a more
specific underwriting criterion.
Interviews with developers of 10 HOP projects in the city of
Boston indicate that these underwriting trends have: narrowed
the "window" of programatically eligible buyers by raising the
floor of lowest allowable incomes and down payments; delayed sale
of units by requiring burdensome documentation and verification
processes; and, ultimately, discouraged production of affordable
homeowernship projects. Developers have responded by
instituting various marketing and applicant preparation
strategies, but many report that these costly and time consuming
hurdles for meeting underwriting requirements are making them
think twice about future affordable housing projects.
The paradox of "HOP units which sat empty" despite the best
intentions and strongest of efforts by banks, developers, and
state and local governments to produce and fill these units on
schedule are reflective of a larger trend in mortgage lending
over the past decade. At root of these forces are dramatic
changes in the nature of residential mortgage lending due to the
phenomenal growth of the national secondary mortgage markets.
These markets, where loans are bought and sold in the form of
marketable securities, have shifted mortgage risk assessment
from an individual case-by-case process to one which employs
nationally uniform standards and approximate, though
quantifiable, standards of risk.
Specifically, the underwriting model which dominated the pre-
secondary market lending environment was based on individualized
standards which stressed "character, collateral and capacity" of
a particular buyer. In contrast, today's "new mortgage lending
environment" is investor driven due to the demands of investors
in securitized mortgage loans for quick risk assessment of
mortgage loans made and sold in massive volume over a national
market.
During the early 80's, secondary market agencies and primary
mortgage insurance companies experienced dramatic increases in
the incidence of loan default. These increases are widely
recognized today as stemming predominantly from macroeconomic
factors related to regional "boom-bust" economies, high
unemployment, and declining home values associated with this
nation's worst recession since the Great Depression. However,
secondary market and PMI underwriters have responded to these
macro factors by instituting more stringent "micro" underwriting
standards concerning, for example, debt ratios, income
documentation, and down payments of the individual buyer.
The combined impact of both standardization of underwriting
and the more recent restrictive underwriting practices adopted by
secondary market agencies and private mortgage insurers have
fallen almost exclusively on the first time moderate income
homebuyer. This is the case because these households, by
definition, have no prior ownership history and thus little
equity to make a down payment; tend to have moderate incomes
relative to owner occupants; tend to have shorter, less stable
work and credit histories; and almost invariably require primary
mortgage insurance, where the bulk of underwriting restrictions
have occurred in recent years.
The experiences under the HOP program and the reactions to
them mark both a need for and the possibility of more regionally
appropriate mortgage underwriting standards -- appropriate in the
sense that from the lender's and borrower's perspective, they
more accurately reflect both the macro and micro factors
affecting the riskiness of particular loans in the Boston
context. Amended standards would depend less on strictly
followed ratio and down payment standards and more on a
combination of specific borrower characteristics (such as past
rent paying history and particular credit experience),
representing a return in part to more individualized
underwriting. Additionally, this new process would give greater
emphasis to the regional "macro" factors concerning the context
of the local housing market and outlook for local economic
health.
Particularly given the Boston housing context and the current
amount of subsidy required to reduce home prices to levels
affordable by moderate income families, more regionally-oriented
mortgage underwriting guidelines can contribute substantially to
homeownership affordability. For example, even a 3% change in
allowable housing expense to income ratios (ie, the amount of
income a buyer can devote to monthly mortgage payments) can be
more cost effective and, arguably, more equitable than an
additional $10,000 home price reduction or 1% mortgage interest
subsidy.
Such a program could be developed by local lenders and
national underwriters alike in a manner that opens doors to an
increased number of still profitable lending opportunities while
averting the highest risk loan cases. The model may require
higher "transactions" costs associated with more careful and
individualized screening, i.e., similar to the "careful case-by-
case screening" used in the Federal Housing Authorities
underwriting processl. Nevertheless, it may also contribute to
local efforts to provide affordable housing, may provide a
feasible and profitable way for banks to get into the business of
making loans to lower income communities, and may provide a
model representative of what national secondary agencies and
mortgage insurers could do to meet local needs in the future,
particularly by considering greater involvement in "non-
conforming" loans.
IThe FHA is a currently active public mortgage insurance
agency created in 1938 by federal government for the purposes of
insuring lenders against loss due to default and thus increasing
the flow of available credit into mortgage markets -- see HUD,
1986.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, STUDY SCOPE AND DATA SOURCES
Boston's potential homebuyers, like all Boston residents, are
currently faced with an unprecedented gap between the income they
can afford to allocate toward housing expenses and median
housing prices in the city. Between 1979 and 1987, average home
prices for single family dwellings increased 156% (from roughly
$48,000 to $175,000), while during the same period wages rose by
less than 60% (from roughly $17,000 to $27,000).1 Relative to
the rest of the nation, Boston's homebuyers fare among the worst
off: in 1986, Boston's median area home price at $159,200 was
double the national average while Boston area median wages, at
$21,936, were only 10% higher than the national median. 2
The affordability gap has hit the moderate income first time
homebuyer particulary hard, because of this household's dual
constraints of income and wealth. A moderately priced home in
Dorchester selling for $130,000, for example, would require a
minimum income of $47,000 and up-front cash of roughly $18,000 to
afford under conventional lending terms. 3
1 BRA, "Boston Housing Facts & Figures", and "Boston's
Housing 1988".
2Greiner, p. 16
3 Author's calculations based on 10% down payment, mortgage
financing starting at 9.5%, and monthly expenses and closing
costs as calculated in Appendices III and IV.
Given these circumstances, an unprecedented amount of
subsidy has become required to provide affordable homeownership
opportunities for the moderate income households who have
traditionally been the target of federal and state housing
programs. Over the past few years, The Massachusetts' Housing
Partnership's Homeownership Opportunity Program has offered a
combination of reduced prices at 25% to 50% be-low median
neighborhood home prices and initial interest rates of 5-6%
(nearly half the current market rate). Yet, in today's market,
even these subsidy levels have managed to reach only the top
third of moderate income households -- those with incomes
between roughly $27,500 and $32,500.4
Today's policymakers are faced with the questions of which
additional policy tools could increase homeownership access to
households of lower-moderate incomes, and whether or not the
costs of such additional subsidies can be justified given more
pressing needs of other population groups. Starting from the
premise that increased homeownership opportunities in lower
income neighborhoods is a feasible and desireable policy goal,
there are several possible policy options to consider,
including: increased mortgage subsidies through further interest
rate buy-downs; additional home price subsidies through decreased
4MHP, HOP Guidelines and HOP data base for Boston projects
occupied as of 2/27/89.
construction financing costs and lower cost design elements; or
reduced home prices through alternative forms of social
homeownership.5
Another alternative, the focus of this thesis, is the
adoption of less restrictive mortgage underwriting guidelines.
These guidelines determine access to homeownership for households
with lower incomes and little wealth by establishing, for
example, minimum downpayment requirements and maximum debt to
income ratios. Underwriting guidelines are intended to reflect
the level of risk associated with certain types of buyers, loans
and properties which, together with structural economic
conditions, determine the liklihood that a given loan will end in
default.6
Financial intermediaries have always used judgements
concerning particular loan and borrower attributes in order to
evaluate loan riskiness. However, largely due to the growth in
the secondary mortgage market, this process has become
5Limited equity cooperatives and land trusted properties,
for example, are alternative homeownership forms which have
become the focus of many community based developers and loan
funds. The former may lower homeownership costs by limiting
equity of cooperative members to a share in the coop association,
which owns and maintains the property. The latter reduce home
prices by retaining land within a community trust, selling only
the actual structure to the buyer.
6 HUD, 1986, p. 5.8
increasingly uniform and simplified in recent years. 7  The
secondary market, established by the Federally Sponsored Credit
Agencies, provides liquidity to mortgage loans by purchasing
loans from financial intermediaries, packaging those loans into
marketable securities backed by government or agency guarantees,
and selling those securities to investors on the secondary
market.
In order to trade huge volumes of mortgage loans in a
national secondary market, lenders, insurers and investors must
have a fairly uniform procedure for valuing loan packages and
assessing their risk of default. The appproximate, but
quantifiable standards which are set by the federally sponsored
credit agencies and mortgage insurers 8 are now employed on an
industry-wide basis. 9  However, due to depressed economic
conditions, slow home appreciation rates and new mortgage
instruments of the early 1980s, default experience was high among
these national mortgage underwriters, and many have since adopted
increasingly restrictive underwriting guidelines. 10
7Freddie Mac, 1988. This standardization of underwriting
will be explained more fully in Chapter 3.
8 e.g., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, Federal Housing
Administration and Veterans Administration insurance, and
private mortgage insurance companies.
9Freddie Mac, pp 17, 25-26.
10HUD, March 1986, p. 5.1
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Affordable housing advocates today question the
reasonableness of these national standards given the contemporary
Boston context, and have argued that less restrictive standards
are requisite to providing homeownership access to Boston's first
time moderate income buyers. The Massachusetts Affordable
Housing Alliance, Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory
Group, and Massachusetts Association of Community Development
Corporations, for example, have brought to public forum issues
facing their homebuyer and community developer constituents,
negotiating initiatives with the city, state and private
financial intermediaries to address these concerns. As many of
these issues are also on the forefront of community-based
negotiations with private lending institutions, it becomes
particularly encumbant upon affordable housing advocates to
understand the nature of risk and potential risk related costs of
such initiatives, their likely benefits, and, in general, the
highly complex mortgage lending environment which has surrounded
this perceived trade off.
This thesis is undertaken with three purposes in mind: 1) to
provide an understanding of the evolution of the secondary
mortgage lending environment and the recent trends toward
nationally uniform and increasingly restrictive measures of
mortgage lending risk; 2) to assess the appropriateness of these
standards for assessing risk in the Boston context; and 3) to
14
assess the potential impacts of the institution of less
restrictive underwriting standards on access to affordable
housing in Boston. It will be argued that more flexible and less
restrictive (though not necessarily less rigorous) underwriting
guidelines can be employed in a fashion which could increase
access to lower income and equity households while controlling
for a maximum acceptable level of risk by more effective
screening of higher risk cases. Additionally, evidence is
presented to indicate that the wholesale commodification of
mortgage lending has led to a situation in which Boston's
households, and particularly moderate income first time buyers,
are likely to be judged infavorably by national underwriting
standards.
Such an analysis must confront the basic trade-off known to
exist between increased risk exposure and increased access to
homeownership. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to
determine the extent to which these proposed underwriting changes
would lead to increased risk and loan default, it will be
demonstrated that even under extreme increases in the incidence
of foreclosure (eg, a quadrupling of cases), underwriting
amendments are likely to be both more cost effective than either
additional financing write-downs or home price subsidies.
In addition, despite the near impossibility of predicting
the liklihood of default based on past lending experiences, 11
current literature on risk experience does suggest that the
national mortgage industry's predominant underwriting standards
are likely to be unreasonably restrictive in Boston. As will be
explained, Boston's moderate income households and the affordable
homes they buy have several characteristics which are commonly
viewed as compensating factors in mortgage lending risk
assessment. In order to successfully consider these compensating
factors in mortgage loan underwriting while avoiding the truly
high risk cases, review processes themselves, including the
policies and procedures for documenting and verifying income and
credit histories, will require change. This combination of more
flexible guidelines and consideration of compensating factors
will probably entail an increase in the "transaction" costs of
processing a mortgage loan as each loan must be underwritten on
the basis of its particular characteristics rather than upon
nationally accepted standards. Any regionally based loan
underwriting and insurance initiative that aims to increase
access to first time buyers will need to recognize those costs
and should integrate them into the overall program.
Nevertheless, even with these addedd costs, underwriting
amendments can provide an effective means of extending
homeownership access. Moreover, experience has demonstrated that
llMortgage default is widely thought to be "caused" by many
factors. In addition to loan, buyer and property
characteristics, the general health of a local economy is thought
to be of utmost importance. See HUD, 1986, p. 5.2
without such change, even large subsidies can fail to provide
homes for seemingly eligible and programatically targetted
buyers.
The "problem" of the new model of mortgage underwriting has
been framed through the experiences of developers and buyers
under The Massachusett's Housing Partnership's Homeownership
Opportunity Program (HOP). HOP provides an illustrative context
in which to examine the impacts of various secondary market
underwriting criteria for three reasons: 1) because HOP units
are subsidized in part through mortgage bond financing, they are
highly tied to secondary market standards and the demands of
ultimate investors in those bonds; 2) studies have indicated that
the most frequently cited problem with the HOP project has been
the "difficulty in finding qualified buyers for HOP units because
of the narrow window of eligibility -- that is, households must
have incomes low enough to comply with the HOP guidelines, but
high enough to cover mortgages"1 2 ; and 3) no less than six
initiatives, including many underwriting-related amendments, have
been enacted or discussed under the HOP program in recent
monthsl 3 . These initiatives, which are being replicated or
considered among other groups, provide a practical context in
which to estimate the effects of marginal underwriting changes
12Nash et al, 1989.
13conversations with MHP staff, new HOP guideline brochure,
3/89
across various neighborhoods and income levels. They include:
- increases in allowable "housing-to-income" and "debt-to-
income" ratios from 28% to 30% and possibly 33%
- reductions in up-front cash requirements, e.g. down-
payments and closing costs via the allowance of gift
letters and "soft second" mortgages
- reductions in primary mortgage insurance premiums
- a further write down in unit prices via a second mortgage
- a marketing clearinghouse which would provide pre-
screening and mortgage application training to prospective
buyers.14
While price writedowns and mortgage interest subsidies have
always been features of the HOP program and are not considered
"secondary market" underwriting guidelines, these tools are also
discussed as they directly affect the affordability of HOP units.
Moreover, interest rate write-downs are among the elements
commonly discussed in private initiatives as well, for example in
negotiations of community-based organizations with local banks to
formulate first-time buyer programs.
This analysis of secondary market impacts on local housing
affordability and credit availability is organized in five
chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the experience of the
Homeownership Opportunity Program in terms of the initial goals,
strategies and activity under the program. Interviews with
developers of 12 HOP projects in Boston provide lessons from
their first-hand experience with underwriting review processes
during the course of developing and marketing HOP units.
14Information from HOP applicants manual, MHFA Newsletters,
interoffice memos within the Massachusetts Housing Partnership,
and preliminary proposals submitted by MHP to the Massachusetts
Association of Community Development Corporations, 9/89-3/89.
Chapter 3 outlines broad changes in national credit markets
underlying the HOP experience. This chapter briefly reviews the
nature of underwriting standards as a factor of housing
affordability. Then, widespread changes in the mortgage lending
environment, the role of secondary markets in establising and
promulgating uniform underwriting standards, and the present
rigidity of these standards are discussed.
Chapter 4 discusses the risk related implications of proposed
changes in underwriting standards. Given the particular context
of the Boston housing market, HOP housing units, and Boston's
moderate income buyers, it is argued that more flexible
underwriting standards make sense regionally.
Finally, in Chapter 5, initiatives being implemented and
discussed for the HOP program are presented and analyzed in terms
of their potential impact. A comparison among actual buyers of
HOP units to date and potential buyers under proposed changes is
set against the background of the total first time buyer
population in Boston's lower income neighborhoods in order to
estimate the probable effect of these initiatives on the HOP
"eligibility window". A maximum acceptable limit of increased
default is calculated to demonstrate how much lending risk would
have to increase in order for such changes to be less cost
effective than certain other subsidy alternatives.
DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS STUDY
The HOP Experience
Data employed in the HOP analysis consist of two primary
sources. In addition to interviews with HOP developers, the
Massachusetts Housing Partnership kindly provided information on
appraised values, unit prices, purchaser incomes, HOP subsidy
amounts and closing dates for Boston projects. In addition, the
Department of Public Facilities provided the names of developers
and marketing agents who were contacted for the survey.
Boston's Population Characteristics: Income, Owner Occupants
vs. Renters, and Rental Expenses
Income and rent data used in this thesis are obtained largely
from the 1985 Boston Redevelopment Authority Household Survey.
The BRA household survey, conducted during the first quarter of
1985 and published in August 1985, contains the most detailed
data on Boston at the Neighborhood Statistical Area (NSA) level
since the 1980 U.S. Housing census was published. All in all,
nearly 200 questions were asked in the survey, and only a small
amount of this information is employed in this thesis. The use
of computerized data from this survey, in conjunction with a
database manager and structured query language, allowed
extraction of particular population groups and the linking of
these groups with other characteristics relevant to
homeownership.
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As a sample survey and not a census of the entire population,
the BRA Household survey is subject to a degree of sampling
error. A description of methodology used in the BRA sample and
in subsequent elimination of "non-valid" cases for the purposes
of this analysis is contained in Appendix I, along with a
discussion of the advantages, limitations and level of
confidence associated with this data.
Boston's Lower Income Neighborhoods
Neighborhood data employed in this study are based on
Boeton's 16 Neighborhood Planning Districts (NPDs) as defined by
the Boston Redevelopment Authority. "Low income" neighborhoods
refer to those with 1989 median incomes below $15,000, including
Roxbury, East Boston, South Boston, Jamaica Plain, and North
Dorchester. Moderate income neighborhoods refer to those with
median incomes between $15,000 and $25,000 including South
Dorchester, Fenway-Kenmore, Allston-Brighton, Mattapan,
Roslindale and Hyde Park. The term "lower income" will be used
to refer to both low and moderate income NPDs. In most cases,
however, the discussion of lower income NPDs will concentrate on
those neighborhoods containing HOP projects (see Table I).
Definition of the First-Time Homebuyer
Traditional definitions of first-time homebuyers are
considerably more restrictive than the definition used within
this report. In previous research, income data used to determine
affordability to first-time homeownership have been restricted,
for example, to married couples between the age of 25 to 29 who
TABLE I
Boston's Neighborhood Planning Districts,
Low and Moderate Income Neighborhoods,
and Neighborhoods in Which HOP Projects Have Been Developed
* 1. East Boston
* 2. Charlestown
3. South Boston
* 4. Central
5. Back Bay/Beacon Hill
* 6. South End
7. Fenway/Kenmore
8. Allston/Brighton
* 9. Jamaica Plain
* 10. Roxbury
* 11. N. Dorchester
* 12. S. Dorchester
13. Mattapan
14. Roslindale
15. West Roxbury
16. Hyde Park
LEGEND:
= Low Income NPDs
(1988 median renter incomes below $15,000)
= Moderate Income NPDs
(1988 median renter incomes b/t $15,000-$25,000)
* = Neighborhoods with HOP projects
Source: Income Based on BRA Household Survey, 1985, inflated to
1988 dollars with the CPI for Boston, 1985-1988. Inflator:
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Quarterly Econ. Indicators. HOP
neighborhoods: Mass Housing Partnership Database as of 2/27/89.
are renters. 1 5  The present study does not exclude renter
households of a particular age, or of a particular marital
status. Both the reality of current demographics and the
explicit non-discriminatory nature of the state's homeownership
programs imply that "married" and "between 25-35" are
inappropriate limits to the present analysis of homeownership
demand.
While including renter households regardless of family
composition, age, or income, a target group will be defined as
those who are "income eligible" for subsidized homeownership
opportunities. Generally speaking, the specific definitions vary
depending on the specific program, housing tenure, and subsidy
involved. "Moderate income" households are defined by federal
and state requirements as falling between 50-80% of the Boston
SMSA median income. "Low income" is similarly defined as those
households at or below 50% of median. Here, the definitions used
have been chosen to approximate those of the HOP program and to
accomodate available statistics:
"Moderate income" households will refer to those who make
between $17,500 and $32,500, or 43-80% of area median. These
are households programatically eligible for "HOP" units under
the HOP program, although to date, the majority of homebuyers
have tended toward the top of this income range.1 6
15See, e.g., Joint Center for Housing Studies, "The State of
the Nation's Housing: 1988", and DePasquele, Denise, "First Time
Homebuyers: Issues and Policy Options", p. 3.
16Ibid
For each of Boston's Neighborhood Planning Districts, the
proportions of renter households and moderate income households
are estimated in Table II. These populations, together, will be
referred to as "first time buyers".
TABLE II
Total, Renter, and Moderate Income Household Populations
in Boston Neighborhood Planning Districts
Total
Household
Population*
% of House-
holds who
Rent *
% of Renters
w. Moderate
Incomes***
Total Cases
In BRA
Survey****
East Boston
Charlestown
South Boston
Central
Back Bay/Beacon
South End
Fenway/Kenmore
Allston/Brighton
Jamaica Plain
Roxbury
N Dorchester
S Dorchester
Mattapan
Roslindale
W Roxbury
Hyde Park
NA
13199
29054
22341
24811
23112
25884
61334
41383
56875
25443
58853
39118
31800
33816
32118
519141
69%
65%
70%
67%
81%
90%
94%
80%
80%
80%
80%
59%
60%
37%
31%
24%
68%
30%
29%
17%
8%
37%
32%
26%
42%
23%
24%
22%
31%
34%
44%
24%
25%
29%
* Does not include households in group quarters.
Source: BRA Neighborhood Profile, 1988
* Source: BRA Household Survey, 1985
e* fined as households between 50-80% of SMSA area median.
moderate income is defined as falling between $20,250 and
Source: BRA Household Survey, 1985
**** 84% of these survey respondents completed questions on incomes and rents
83
60
66
61
85
69
86
99
134
135
64
117
131
63
70
74
1399
In 1989,
$32,400
CHAPTER 2 - THE HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM EXPERIENCE
In recent years, a paradox in affordable housing has shocked
state administrators, developers, and affordable housing
advocates alike: Units produced under the Massachusetts Housing
Partnership's Homeownership Opportunity Program (HOP) and
designed for moderate income families were difficult to sell,
despite the tremendous need for affordable housing in Boston's
lower income neighborhoods. This chapter reviews the HOP
experience and identifies the problem of meeting HOP
affordability goals as a problem in obtaining mortgage credit
due, in large part, to difficulty meeting secondary mortgage
market and private mortgage insurance underwriting standards.
The Massachusetts Housing Partnership's Homeownership Opportunity
Program
One of the largest undertakings by the Commonwealth to
address the housing affordability gap, and the only program of
its kind in the nation, was initiated in January of 1986 when
Governor Michael Dukakis announced the inception of the
"Homeownership Opportunity Program" (HOP). The $250 million
program is designed to increase the affordability of
homeownership by encouraging new construction of low-priced units
and assisting lower-income households in purchasing those units.
Projects funded under the HOP program are generally designed
as mixed-income developments which contain both market and below-
market rate homeownership units. At least 30% of homes in HCP
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projects must be priced affordably for low-and moderate-income
residents of Boston.1 Up to another 20% of the homes may be
affordable to moderate- to middle-income families 2 . Based on
their level of subsidy, these units are termed "HOP" and "MHFA"
units, respectively.
A wide variety of tools, some of which are traditional to
first-time buyer programs, some of which are recently innovative,
are employed to achieve this target and make HOP projects
financially feasible (with limited profit) for developers. These
"margins" of affordability include:
-- low-interest mortgage money through tax-exempt financing,
-- low down payments
-- developer incentives, including eligibility for municipal
and/or state technical assistance, expedited permiting
processes, linkage money, city-owned land at nominal cost
-- deed restrictions to ensure long-term affordability
-- mixed-income development design, such that market-rate unit
sales offset a portion of low-income unit prices.
The first two items have long been standard public policy
tools for increasing the availability and reducing the costs of
mortgage financing. Under the HOP program, the use of
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) bond-financing has
1Massachusetts Housing Partnership, HOP Program Guidelines,
September 1988. Moderate income is defined as 50-80% of median
Boston SMSA income, or $20,250 - $32,400 in 1989.
2Ibid. Though no lower income level is specified for these
units, the upper income limit is currently set at $43,000, or
just above the Boston area median income.
provided 8.4% financing for the MHFA units3. An additional MHP
subsidy provides an interest rate buy-down for HOP units;
Starting at three points below MHFA rates (or 5.4%, currently)
HOP mortgage interest rates increase to the MHFA rate over the
first ten years of the loan.
The other tools used under the program -- developer
incentives, mix-income development design, and deed restrictions
-- are relatively recent innovations, designed to make these
developments financially feasible for developers and to keep
units affordable into the future. Boston HOP projects in
particular tend to involve more pro-bono services, land grants,
improvements, and so forth -- partly because the City holds title
to and is willing to convey a large number of properties, and
partly because of the array of other Boston development resources
such as linkage funds, technical assistance, CDBG funds, the LEND
program, etc. Also, a greater proportion of HOP projects in
Boston are undertaken by Community Development Corporations than
projects in the state as a whole. 4 In addition to a willingness
to forego higher profit margins, as non-profits these CDCs are
eligible for, and frequently utilize, technical assistance, pre-
development planning, and other development related grants (e.g.
those of the quasi-governmental Community Economic Development
3This rate fluctuates with changes in capital market rates;
at 7.9-8.5%, MHFA interest rates have fallen some 2 points below
residential mortgage market rates over the past two years.
4conversations with MHP staff.
Assistance Corporation (CEDAC) and Community Technical Assistance
Corporation (CTAC).5
Deed restrictions, which are being employed in practically
all newly constructed housing in Massachusetts, limit the amount
of equity based on appreciation that an owner may capture upon
sale of the property. In the case of HOP, this limit is based on
the difference between the appraised value of HOP units and their
sales prices, generally between 15-50% of the appraised value.
Any HOP-assisted unit initially selling for 85% or less of its
appraised value will have its subsequent resale price limited by
the same percentage of cost-to-value. 6 Six of the seven
developments studied in this thesis had HOP units priced at less
than 85% of their appraised value (see Developer Survey
Summaries, pp 49-55).
For HOP units priced at 86-100% of their appraised value,
their is no deed restriction requirement, unless the zoning for
the development was secured through the comprehensive permit
process (this has been typical of Boston HOP projects).7
5Ibid.
6HOP brochure, undated (issued early 1989), p. 8.
71bid, and conversations with MHP staff.
THE HOP EXPERIENCE
Expectations and Experiences to Date
Since the HOP program's inception in 1986, response from
both non-profit and for-profit developers interested in producing
HOP units has been high, "far surpassing the expectations of
everyone at MHP", program Director Kate Racer notes. A
combination of the incentives which lower development costs and
an interest or belief in mixed-income developments has drawn 25
applications from developers with HOP proposals for a total of
330 affordable units in the Boston area (see Table III).
The large volume of HOP proposals received by MHP during the
first two years of the program has allowed program administrators
to be more selective in the developers, project types, sites,
and income mix they chose to fund under HOP. In the Spring of
1988, program guidelines were changed to institute a competitive
application process entailing two funding competition rounds each
year.8
Ironically, while the demand to produce HOP units has far
exceeded anyones expectations, selling those units to households
of targetted incomes has proved much more difficult. As one
developer explains, "you had the paradox of people screaming for
more affordable housing, it's certainly needed, and a number of
8 1nteroffice Correspondance, The Executive Office of
Communities and Development; and the MHP newsletter, "HOMEWORD",
Spring 1988.
TABLE III
HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM, COMPLETED AND PIPELINE PROJECTS
Status of All Applications for Boston Projects as of 2/27/89
CHPTR HOP MHFA Market
705 UNITS UNITS Rate
1) Back of the Hill
2) Blue Hill Avenue
3) Bradford Estates
4) Codman Commons
5) Rockvale/Lourdes
6) Sumner Street
7) Roxbury Crossing
8) Webster School
9) Winslow Court
10) Buildable Lots
11) East Berkeley
12) Fountain Hill
13) Homestead St
14) Infill Bldgs
15) Main St
16) Tremont St
17) Markir Lots
18) Dacia St.
19) Edgewood/Sthwd
20) Erie Ellington
21) Geneva Court
22) Langham Court
23) Monsgnr Lyons
24) Robinson St
TOTAL BOSTON
Unit Type as a % of Total Units
Project
1 Status*
I
ROXBURY
ROXBURY
DORCH
S DORCH
JAMAICA PL
N DORCH
ROXBURY
E BOSTON
ROXBURY
N.A.
S END
N DORCH
N.A.
ROX/DORCH
CHAS. TOWN
ROXBURY
N.A.
ROXBURY
ROXBURY
N DORCH
N DORCH
N.A.
N.A.
N DORCH
56 324 110 207
8% 46% 16% 30%
*Code: 1 = complete and occupied; 2 = in construction;
3 = in Predevelopment Stage.
Source: Mass Housing Partnership, HOP Database as of 2/27/89.
developers would like to build affordable units...but the HOP
units sat empty".9 While this has been attributed by both
developers and particularly the MHP as a "marketing problem" due
to a narrow window of income eligibility10 , developer surveys
subsequently indicate that given this narrow window, demand was
relatively high, even among programatically eligible buyers.
However, a large portion of even these potentially eligible
buyers seemed to frequently be hanging very tenously in a
delicate balance between a number of underwriting standards.
The following sections attempt to construct an understanding
of the changing variabies which narrowed the HOP eligibility
window by pushing the minimum floor of the HOP window some $5,000
higher than anticipated, creating a rift between the initial
expectations of the program and its actual performance. Seven
case studies of HOP projects subsequently demonstrate that a
majority of pre-screened applicants were frequently delayed and
often eliminated under an intensive underwriting review process.
From Program Design to Project Execution - A Changing Market
Context and Narrowing of the HOP Eligibility Window
When HOP was first announced, in early 1986, press releases
91nterview, Lewis Garfield, developer for the Blue Hill
Avenue HOP project, 3/28/89.
10the series of workshops and conferences recently held by
HOP have all been entitled, and tend to emphasize this
"marketing" problem aspect.
and media reviews predicted (and initial HOP guidelines actually
stated) that this combination of project cost write-downs,
developer incentives, and low-cost buyer-financing would result
in HOP assisted units that were affordable to households earning
$20-25,000 a year. 11  Yet, in none of the projects surveyed were
the average incomes of low-income buyers less than $26,000, and
most ranged between $29,000 and $33,000 (see developer survey
tables, pp 49-55). What accounted for that difference?
Because the income figures above were quoted in nominal
dollar amounts, inflation certainly accounts for a part of that
difference. Allowing for inflation of 4% per year 1 2 , these
projects could have been expected to sell to families with
incomes of $22,000-27,000 by the time that Boston HOP units
were sold in 1988-1989. However, with the exception of one
development in East Boston, the actual incomes of HOP units in
Boston developments--at $28,000 or $29,000--averaged toward the
higher of these figures (see Developer Survey tables, pp 49-55).
Interest rates on MHFA bonds, increasing nearly a full 1% in
harmony with movements in market-rate interests, may also have
played a role in raising income levels of HOP buyers: some of
those projects which were in pre-development planning or early
11MHFA Newsletter, 3/86, and Boston Globe,
1 2 Roughly the consumer price index for 1987 and 1988-
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Quarterly Economic Indicators.
construction during 1987, when HOP and MHFA rates were 5.0% and
7.9%, may not have counted on 5.5% and 8.5% rates when their
buyers closed during the summer and fall of 1988.
Perhaps a greater factor accounting for this limitation in
affordability is the recent soft market in certain Boston areas-
- As Kate Raiser, director of the MHP explains, the program's
characteristic mixed-income component was designed for a hot
market in which market-rate units could partially offset the
costs of subsidized units.13
More than one developer noted that because of the locations
HOP projects are in, "the only people who move into the market
rate units [in HOP projects] are those who either have no other
choice, or believe in the neighborhood and in mixed income
developments ."14 Presumably, the soft condo market at current
prices has given the former group more housing alternatives.
For example, developers point out that above $90,000, the
HOP and MHFA start loosing their competitiveness over market-
priced units in lower-income neighborhoods. In concurrance with
the BRA survey estimates that most "would be" homeowners would
13MHP Conference, 4/3/89. Also, conversation with MHP
staff.
14Interview, Sylvia Watts, developer for the Bradford
Estates HOP project, 3/30/89. Similar observations made by
developers of Blue Hill Avenue, Back of the Hill, Erie-Ellington,
and Codman Commons.
prefer one, two- or three family homes, they point out that many
of the prospective HOP buyers would also prefer these homes,
especially if they can find one for not too much more than HOP
units.15 In lower-priced housing markets, such as Roxbury, North
Dorchester, and Jamaica Plain, this price differential may be
some $20,000 or $30,000 for single family homes.1 6  It should be
noted, however, that only part of the homebuyer's subsidy is
attributable to below market unit prices, with the other part due
to subsidized mortgage financing.
In any case, the combined result of these market
developments was to narrow the window of eligibility to roughly
the top 40% of the moderate income range, or to $26,000-32,500
income households in practice. Moreover, this income range,
which is defined by the incomes of all households (renter and
owner occupant) in all of metropolitan Boston, represents the
"wealthiest" 20% of Boston's lower income neighborhoods (see
Appendix I, Table B). As a result of this disjuncture between
its initially publicized goals and actual performance, and
perhaps also due to relative nature of what is perceived by
Boston residents as "moderate income", it is not surprising that
15Between 70% and 90% of "Would be Homebuyers" (see Appendix
I, Table A for definition) in the BRA survey reported that they
would prefer a single, two or three family dwelling over a
condominium or other form of ownership.
16 The mean prices for a single family home in Roxbury and
Jamaica Plain in 1987 were roughly $100,000 and $114,000,
respectively (BRA "Facts and Figures", 1988).
HOP has been criticized for its lack of affordability by
affordable housing organizations, developers, and homebuyers
alike.
A secondary effect from the disjuncture between the
program's stated affordability goals, peoples' perception of
"affordable", and actual performance, arises from the resulting
narrow window of income eligibility. The program was from the
start likely to be sensitive to even small changes in the margins
which could affect the eligibility of applicants, including
development costs and unit prices, mortgage financing costs and
applicant income and debt characteristics. Again, while some
Boston HOP units have been priced lower, the majority have been
in the $85,000-$95,000 price range, and thus have been affordable
only to those with incomes between 27,500 to 32,500 -- a narrow
range of eligibility that covers less than 10% of the renter
population in many lower income neighborhoods.17
Moreover, even those who still fit inside the window despite
a higher income floor are theoretically in a very tenous
position. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, a 1% change in
interest rates or 3% change in housing expense to income ratios
can shift income needed to support a given loan by several
thousand dollars -- more than enough to push a household with an
income of 27-28,000 over either limit of the eligibility range.
17See Appendix I, Table B.
Every $25 increase in a monthly mortgage payment at HOP price and
income ranges translates into $1077 added income per year to meet
the 28% requirement. In fact, any marginal change which
increases or decreases monthly housing expenses (ie, estimated
annual income, interest rates) or up-front cash requirements (ie,
a change in PMI premiums, "points", appraisal fees etc, or a
change in loan-to-value ratios), can each individually make or
break the eligibility limit for those with incomes falling in
this range.
In the following section, interviews with developers of 7 of
the nine HOP projects which have closed in Boston indicate that
this hypothetical hypersensitivity to any marginal change, and
particularly underwriting changes, bears out in HOP experience.
However, while this impossibly narrow window could produce only a
small number of even potential buyers, several other underwriting
factors -- the most typical of which include credit rating
issues, income sources, and income and down-payment verification
-- are equally important factors in mortgage loan approval,
according to HOP developers.
Major Barriers to Project Marketing - A Survey of Boston HOP
Developers
In order to determine the frequency of occurance, extent of
impact and methods of response to these underwriting-related
factors, 10 project managers or other development staff and/or
marketing agents were interviewed in March and early April of
1989. An attempt was made to interview representatives from all
9 developments which contained three or more closed HOP units as
of 3/6/89, and 7 of these nine interviews were completed.
Additionally, developers for three of sixteen pipeline projects
which are currently or will soon be under construction and have
begun marketing processes were interviewed.
Those completed projects included in this study are: Blue
Hill Avenue, Roxbury; Brush Hill Commons, Mission Hill (Roxbury);
Fountain Hill/Bradford Estates, North Dorchester; Roxbury
Crossing, Roxbury; Back of The Hill, Mission Hill (Roxbury);
Sumner Street Townhouses, North Dorchester; Codman Commons, and
South Dorchester. The three projects currently under
construction or in predevelopment planning and included in this
study are: Erie/Ellington, Roxbury; Geneva Avenue, Dorchester;
and Main Street Townhouses, Charlestown.
Interviewees were asked questions from a questionnaire
regarding their marketing strategies; choice of location, design
and income mix; total number and characteristics of applicants
for HOP and MHFA units; the underwriting standards (e.g., down
payments, income ratios, documentation and verification
requirements, credit screening) which most frequently delayed or
disqualified applicants; and the nature of the developer's and
applicants' interaction with MHFA, MHP, the loan originators, the
community in which they operate, the City of Boston, and primary
mortgage insurance companies. Interviews ranges in length from
20 minutes to over an hour. A list of interviewees and the
projects they represented is contained in the bibliography of
this thesis.
These surveys indicate that while income ratios and down
payments initially limit the income ceiling and especially the
income floor for HOP units, a secondary "funneling" effect occurs
under the actual application process, primarily due to case-by-
case judgements in which an applicant is disqualified or delayed
due to the sources of their income, their credit history, or the
nature of their downpayment. While the risk of individual
circumstances can only be ascertained on a case by case basis, it
Is clear that developers are bearing the brunt of both the cost
of careful screening and the burden of proof of an applicants
"ability and willingness to pay".
Passing the Initial Screening --
Housing Expense to Income Ratios and Down Payments
According to HOP developers, both housing expense-to-income
ratios and down payments limited the pool of lower income
applicants eligible during initial applicant screenings. While
down payments were reported a much more ubiquitous problem among
subsidized applicants, developers and marketing agents
nevertheless indicated that many were "at the margin" with
respect to both underwriting standards.
Six of the seven developers or marketing agents interviewed
referred to these problems as ones which created a "narrow window
of eligibility". Lewis Garfield of Bergmeyer Development
Corporation, the Developers of the Blue Hill Avenue HOP project,
noted "There were major problems finding applicants who could fit
into the window by meeting the ratios, and still have the savings
for a downpayment". Developers of Brush Hill Commons, the
Bradford Estates, Roxbury Crossing, (Back of the Hill) and Sumner
Street Development Corporation all noted that housing ratios and
down payments immediately or eventually disqualified their lowest
income applicants, many by narrow margins.
Martha Dewaney, marketing agent for the Codman Commons
project, noted the interrelatedness of the factors, explaining,
"without a ten percent down payment, many of our applicants
couldn't meet the income requirements, but that left us the
problem of trying to see how these buyers with very few savings
could come up with the up-front cash requirements."18
With the exception of one developer19 whose units closed
recently enough to receive closing cost and down payment
18Because lower down payments increase the loan size for a
given home price, they are associated with higher monthly
payments.
19Back of the Hill Community Development Corporation
assistance under new HOP/MHFA initiatives, every developer
interviewed also noted that down payments were a major barrier to
not only the lowest income group, but to those making toward the
top of the HOP income limit and even MHFA buyers. Most of these
developers indicated that even 5% down payments, when coupled
with additional closing costs equalling roughly 4.5% of the home
price 20 , were tough for their applicants to come up with.
Given a typical 2 bedroom HOP unit selling for $85,000, a 5%
down payment and standard closing costs would require an
applicant to have on hand over $8,000 in up front cash
requirements. With a 10% down payment, up front cash
requirements increase to $12,300. If buyers could obtain gifts
from their families for half of the down payment, these figures
would still amount to $6,000 and $8,000, respectively. Even
those developers who were able to qualify buyers for 95% loan-to-
value ratios expressed difficulty in finding applicants who could
come up with cash requirements, or in helping them to do so.
Four -- including developers of Bradford Estates, Sumner Street,
Roxbury Crossing, and Codman Commons -- maintained that despite
the allowance for 2 1/2% gift payments (from families, under past
rules) or the ability to work around those rules, even then the
lack of savings among both lowest and moderately low HOP and MHFA
buyers restricted tiehr pool of applicants.
20See Appendix II
Because of the ubiquitousness of the dow payment problem,
in fact, many applicants apparently were not "pre-screened" on
this qualification in a practical sense. Most of the developers
pre-screening processes did not require full documentation for
income and available savings for up-front cash requirements, thus
many applicants presumably "fudged" their initial applications.
This was particularly true for down payments, which many
applicants felt they could somehow ".come up with" (through
family, friends, or immediate efforts to save) before
verifications would be required.
Five developers, in fact, openly stated their willingness to
work with applicants to find ways around the down payment
requirements. Many implied that down payment gifts were obtained
somehow, and made to fit the MHFA and PMI's criterion that allow
gifts only from family members. Ellen Grout, Office Manager of
Sumner Street Development Corporation, reported that the
developers were having such a hard time finding buyers who met
the income and down requirements that they "finally decided to
just give buyers $5000 outright, but MHFA wouldn't allow that".
This difficulty was exacerbated in cases in which developers
were unable to obtain the primary mortgage insurance required to
permit 5% down loans, particularly if marketing was based on the
premise that such insurance would be available.
Down Payments and Primary Mortgage Insurance
In order to qualify for a mortgage loan with only a 5%
downpayment, MHFA and virtually all secondary brokers require
borrowers to have primary mortgage insurance. While even those
who were able to obtain primary mortgage insurance and thus
qualify for 5% down payments had problems coming up with that
money, four developers experienced the additional problem of
finding a PMI (or getting MHFA to find a PMI) which was willing
to underwrite these loans.
Sylvia Watts of Bradford Estates noted that while they had
started marketing for the project in spring of 1987 and had
selected buyers, the PMI company that was going to insure those
buyers (VEREX) went bankrupt. The resulting delays in closing
while a new PMI was sought required the development company to
obtain a third mortgage from the Neighborhood Redevelopment
Corporation to pay for the empty units.
Another developer, who asked not to be cited by name, noted
that while MHFA had made financing commitments for 5% down loans,
they later seemed to hedge on this commitment when difficulty
arose in finding a PMI: "after we had selected buyers, and
started sending them to the bank, the bank started calling to
say, 'don't send us any more 5% down buyers -- we can't process
them because you can't get the PMI for them'. We finally got
MHFA to get us PMI, but only with a lot of hassle".
Ellen Grout of Sumner Street also noted that finding a PMI
to underwrite the 5% down loans delayed the application review
process. "We were in limbo for two months. MHFA was supposed to
be working on it, but didn't".
Similarly, the developers of Codman Commons had to find
buyers who could come up with 10% down payments as a result of a
$1500 increase in yearly PMI premiums for 10% down loans and the
inability of MHFA to provide PMI for 5% down loans.
In two of these cases, there seemed to be some level of
confusion as to whose responsibility it is to obtain PMI.
While in the early days of the program, no clear policy was
defined, MHFA has increasingly assumed responsibility for this
role, and today, a MHFA/GE co-insurance plan has been initiated
for the express purpose of insuring 5% down loans.
Unfortunately, however, there is evidence that this reluctance of
some PMIs to cover 5% down loans is becoming an industrywide
trend. As will be discussed in later chapters of this thesis,
when coupled with a growing reluctance of banks to portfolio
loans or to self-insure 5% down loans, this could endanger the 5%
down loan altogether.
Meeting the income ratios and down payments required by
secondary market (including housing finance agency and PMI)
underwriting standards have, in fact, become two of the most
common barriers to first-time homebuyers cited by organizations
of homebuyers, public interest research groups initiating CRA
agreements, and community-based developers alike. 2 1  However,
while these two standards together constituted the primary
restrictions which limit the lowest potential eligibility limit
for HOP projects, many projects had ten to fifteen times the
number of pre-qualifying applicants than units, and still
experienced difficulty in filling them due to the underwriting
review process.
Most Marginal Buyers -- Higher Risk, or Unnecessary
Inflexibility?
A second category of "marginal" HOP buyers, these developers
report, consists of those who did pass preliminary screening, but
were later rejected for countless variations on a couple of
themes: their credit histories, family sizes, income
verification, and changes in income or debt position. The high
level of post-screened rejections resembles a funneling effect in
which only one-half, one-fifth, or even one-tenth of thoroughly
screened applicants remain after "washouts".
In part, it is the base amount of time taken to process
applications which allows for considerable change in an
2lSee, e.g., MAHA, 2/89; Boston Globe, 3/5/88;
applicants situation in what is an already dynamic situation.
Because many marketing agents have experienced situations in
which a person's debt composition changes, this experience has
been referred to the "whatever you do, tell your applicants not
to go out and buy a car" lesson. However, the incredible
diversity, complexity, and inconsistency with which various
secondary market standards are employed seldom fails to take
marketing agents, developers and even mortgage bankers for HOP by
surprise.
Documentation and Verification for Sources of Income, Down
Payments, and Credit History- "Whatever you do, Don't Go Out and
Buy a Car"
The underwriting requirements currently set down by MHFA and
PMIs which determine the exact documentation and verification for
stable sources of income and for items at issue on credit reports
take their toll in the amount of time required to approve a
buyer.
For example, developers reported unanimously that their
efforts to find eligible buyers for HOP and MHFA units were often
thwarted by what seemed illogical or inconsistent policy with
respect to approving various sources of income. Five
developers22 cited one or more cases in which income they felt
positively should not have counted toward family income was
2 2 Roxbury Crossing, Sumner Street, Blue Hill Avenue, Codman
Commons and Bradford Estates
counted, and vice-versa.
These cases involved, for example, individuals who had
recent overtime because they were trying to save for furniture
(the developer, who had evidence of previous income levels, felt
that this was clearly not a source of stable income); individuals
who had kids who were saving for college, or for marriage and an
apartment of their own; or household which currently rely and are
likely to rely on income from a second job, more than one wage
earner, bonus pay, or overtime.
While in each of these cases the developer felt they had
sufficient information on which to judge the quality and likely
stability of income, the burden of proof often requires several
months time and substantial work on the part of the developer and
applicant to prove. If there were no unforeseen circumstances,
developers reported that the application process took from 3-6
months (Bradford Estates, Back of the Hill, Sumner Street). If
reverification or further documentation was required, this
processing time might be extended by several additional months.
Consider the following estimates made by developers:
- time to review initial applications required by the bank, MHFA,
and HOP, per applicant: 1-2 hours.
- time to obtain copies of tax returns: 3 months
- time to correct an item on a credit report: 3-6 months +
- time to obtain employer income verification -- varies,
depending on employer, but can be months especially if
overtime, dual incomes, unusual income are involved.
In addition, the community outreach which is requisite for
finding initial buyers takes considerable time, and many
developers are also in the process of trying to do pre-ownership
and property training.
Despite these estimates by developers, the secondary giants
(Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) and bankers alike have long boasted
decreased average processing times for mortgage loans. The
former contend that as a result of uniform standards promoted by
the Federally Sponsored Credit Agencies, "our automated and
expedited underwriting system has reduced processing from an
average of 90 days to an average of 17 days". 2 3 This may be
true for higher equity, higher income buyers, but the HOP
experience indicates, for first time moderate income buyers
buying with 5% down payments, the underwriting process is, not
infrequently, many times longer than advertised or anticipated.
Similarly, Linda Bullard (Loan Officer for Shawmut Bank,
Master Lender of the HOP Program) maintains that the underwriting
process should take no more than a few weeks if the buyer is
prepared and has a completely clear record.2 4  However, in
2 3Goetz, Vice-President of FHLMC, at a conference on
"Secondary Mortgage Markets and Local Housing Programs", 2/9/89,
Washington D.C.
2 4Bullard, at a HOP Marketing Conference, 4/3/89.
addition to income and down payment verifications, applicants are
required to have a completely clean "hard copy" credit report 2 5
for the past two years, and be able to prove exceptional
circumstances for any questionable items over the life of the
reports (which just recently have been revised to include 10,
rather than 7 years of credit).26 These rigid credit
requirements appear to create the longest and most frequent
delays in applicant approval.
Credit History - "You Cant' Make Less than $30,000, have more
than 2 kids, and not have a credit problem".
This statement by Sylvia Watts seemed to echo that of every
developer, whatever their applicants' particular experience.
Every HOP project which had closed in Boston had an anecdote to
tell about "notorious Sears", or other revolving credit companies
which report their customers for every dollar that is a day late;
about individuals who had been defrauded at one time or another
and contested a bill which nevertheless remained on their record;
about a hospital bill which was past due because of slow
insurance processing; the list is endless. Bullard estimates
that even for conventional buyers, some 15% of all credit reports
contain inaccuracies due to "double reporting" alone (ie,
2 5Hard. copy credit reports take several weeks to obtain and
are somewhat more detailed than "soft copy" reports which can be
generated daily through a loan originator's on line computer system.
2 6 Linda Bullard, Mortgage Officer of Shawmut Bank,
Interview, 4/3/89.
combined items from another individual's, often a family
member's, record).27
As is the case with income verification, the burden of proof
lies in the applicant's ability to prove "exceptional"
circumstances, and the required correction on a hard copy credit
report can take two or even several months. Again, while some
developers indicated that many applicants truly were bad credit
risks, all indicated that the erroneous cases did occur, and
sometimes more frequently than even what they considered
"legitimate" credit risks.
Other Underwriting Technicalities: Family Sizes, Construction
Design, and First-Time Buyer Qualifications
Less frequently cited by developers were underwriting issues
which involved family and unit sizes, construction design and
first-time buyer qualifications. Two developers experienced
problems placing applicants because of family sizes, one because
families were larger than units called for, the other because
they were smaller than the allowable size. In the former case,
a woman and her two children in a South Dorchester project were
disqualified for a two-bedroom unit because MHFA does not allow
2 7Bullard, 4/3/89.
children over the age of 12 to share rooms.2 8  In the latter
case, a family which had two children and planned to have more
was disqualified for a three-bedroom unit. "This type of
requirement doesn't allow a family any flexibility to grow, and
is especially exclusionary given the fact that buyers are asked
to sign a 30 year lease, in effect", noted one developer. 29
In one non-Boston HOP project, a technical disqualification
occured when a woman made it almost to closing, but was
disqualified when it was discovered that her name was placed on a
piece of investment property of her father's years ago.
Technically, the woman was not a "first time buyer". 3 0  While
this was perhaps an extreme case, it nevertheless points to the
rigidity of rules on paper and the distance between underwriter
and borrower under today's lending environment. One developer
noted that "the borrower never even meets anyone from MHFA or
PMIs"31 and several developers noted confusion as to the role of
MHFA, the bank and PMIs in getting the borrower through the
underwriting process. For some developers, banks seemed to be
interpreting rules harshly; for others, MHFA seemed to call the
shots; still others thought that the PMIs were the primary
28Interview, Ellen Grout, 3/28/89. Also, see MHFA Single
Family Programs, 1988, p.
29Interview, Pable Calderon, 4/89.
30Developer at a HOP Marketing Conference, 4/3/89.
3lPablo Calderon, Developer for Roxbury Crossing HOP
project.
obstacle to getting mortgage financing. As the following chapter
will discuss, the feeling that underwriters are shielded from
borrowers is largely an outgrowth of secondary mortgage marekts
and the new standardized underwriting model.
Developer Responses - Marketing Hints, and Suggestions for
Programatic Change
Partly as a matter of financial necessity, partly in order
to achieve affordability goals, developers have responded by
devoting a considerable amount of time in consulting with,
training, and playing a general advocacy role for buyers to get
them mortgage financing. While some developers have addressed
these issues by hiring a "good marketing agent" and a "credit
consultant who straightened up these families' credit
situations"3 2 , many others are assuming these roles themselves.
Again, the strategies being adopted by developers of HOP
projects can be classified as those which try to increase the
initial pool of "appropriate" applicants, and those which try to
ensure that those applicants will get through the review process.
It has already been noted that as a result of the tremendous
washout rate, developers (and state officials) typically
32Interview, Sylvia Watts, 4/89.
recommend selecting three to four times more eligible33
applicants than units.
Many developers of the HOP projects studied attempted to
increase their initial applicant pools by using certain
newspapers which were more effective than others in a particular
community (e.g., especially in communities with large populations
of non-english speaking individuals); performing community
outreach with churches, community based developers, MAHA, and
other groups with strong community ties who could often provide a
good pool of applicants; or even redesigning a development's
informational pamphlet to encourage application by households who
were more likely to exceed minimum income limits (e.g., Bradford
Estates changed advertisement income guidelines to an hourly wage
of $14 to circumvent confusion about what income sources counted
or didn't. However successful, such an approach may limit the
number of applications from those with secondary income sources
who might otherwise be viable borrowers).
Some developers have held special homeownership training
workshops and encourage early preparation techniques such as
obtaining a credit report and planning a budget. Many of the
these tactics and suggestions are entailed in HOP's new pilot
3 3 Thoroughly screened - which generally means having
submitted a complete application, identifying account numbers and
sources of income, debt, etc, but not necessarily having
presented complete documentation.
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clearinghouse program, as outlined in the following section of
this chapter. The availability of marketing assistance will be
particularly significant for those non-proit developers who have
extremely limited staff and financial resources to play the role
of credit counsellor.
Summary
In general, what these variety of cases indicate is that,
like the Director of Underwriting for FHLMC says, "underwriting
is an extremely judgemental process. It cannot be accomplished
by ratios alone".3 4  Outside of thorough reviews for each
applicant there is, obviously, no way to separate out those who
lie about their incomes, or have incomes which are likely to be
instable, or are serious credit risks because of their past
histories, from those who can demonstrate "ability and
willingness to pay". As the recommendations in the concluding
section of this study will indicate, this does not necessarily
imply that the costs of screening must be high or take an undue
amount of time. It does mean, however, that any program
designed to enhance mortgage credit access will need to address
not just ratios and down payments, but documentation and
verification criteria as well.
As the current situation stands under the HOP program, it
341Interview, John Hempschoot, Freddie Mac, 4/89.
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is apparent that the burden of proof and the costs (both in time
and money) of providing that proof currently rest on the shoulder
of the applicant and the developer. "Despite our concern, (and a
host of initiatives to prove it), developers and their
communities are still responsible for the marketing of HOP
units", maintains Kate Racer in regard to the "marketing"
problem.35
A priori, we would expect there to be some limit beyond
which these costs would be perceived as prohibitive. In the
least serious case, either the developer has become less
selective in who occupies a unit (generally meaning, has selected
higher income applicants) or a frustrated buyer has dropped out
of the review process.
More seriously, and that which affected each and every buyer
surveyed, is the situation in which units which do not close on
schedule cost the developer money and threaten the financial
viability of the project or the company. The Project Surveys on
pp 48-54 indicate that each of these HOP projects had units
which remained open for two or more months past construction
completion and initial closing dates. Some projects have been
filled only over the course of a year or more. What this amounts
to is, as one developer puts it, "we basically end up paying the
35MHP Conference, 4/3/89.
bank for financing empty units".3 6
Perhaps the most detrimental long term impact of these
underwriting standards indicated by the HOP experience is the
feeling among developers that the trouble may not be worth the
effort. The developers of Sumner Street feel that "the paper
work is horrendous and no one wants to budge an inch. The time
factor -is so bad that we have become discouraged about the
prospects of doing projects in the future". Those of Blue Hill
Avenue maintain that "PFD is still trying to understand how
private developers wok, but at the same time, they seem to be
working against providing them incentives". The serious threat
that these problems pose to future production of affordable
homeownership units demands that underwritig issues and policies
be integrated or taken endogenous to a homeownership program.
This has, as will be demonstrated, only been partially
accomplished within the initiatives being implemented under HOP.
The HOP program has (sometimes jokingly) been referred to as
the "program that makes up the rules as it goes along",37 and
there is some truth to this characterization. In part, program
administrators and developers have had to contend with a window
of eligibility which was from time units came on line much
narrower (and higher) than anticipated. Despite this narrow
36Henry Joseph, Developer for Brush Hill Commons, 4/89.
37Attendee at a HOP Marketing Conference, 4/89.
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window, however, demand and even programatically eligible demand
for HOP units has been high.
What created the difficulty in marketing HOP units was
actually mortgaging HOP buyers. In sum, the predominant opinion
among developers as to the causes of this mortgageability problem
are: 1) ratios and down payment requirements that are overly
restrictive; 2) credit reviews, income verification processes,
and documentation requirements which are overly burdensome and
rigid; and 3) a combination of lack of coordination between
originators, insurers, and purchasers, as well as a general
inaccessibility and distance of loan underwriters who, again, as
one developer points out "never even meet with buyers".3 8 As the
following chapter will suggest, these problems are largely the
outcome of changes in the mortgage lending environment generated
by a young, but tremendously large and influential, secondary
mortgage market.
38Interview, Pable Calderon, 4/89.
HOP SURVEY RESULTS BACK OF THE HILL/BRICKLAYERS HSG CO - ROXBURY
1) # Unit Total .................. oH0P...................33
MHFA 58
Market 58
BRA 16
2) Average HOP 2 BDRM...........
3) Average MHFA 2 BDRM..........
4) MARKETING
# Applicants ............
# Lottery
# Initially Filled
Marketing Period
Lottery Date:
Units Sold As of 2/27/89:
Closing Date(s):
Appraised........
Price
Range
Mortgage
Income
Appraised........
Price
Range
Mortgage
Income
112,500-135,000
79,900
60,500- 87,500
75, 500
26,800
125, 000
105,500
94, 500-107, 500
N.A.
41, 988
700-800 Passed Initial Screening
100 selected
56 signed a P & S; 44 fell through
8/88
14 HOP, 9 MHFA
1/89-2/89
UNDERWRITING PROBLEMS
1: Documentation/Verification - length of time for obtaining
and correcting reports.
2: Credit Problems (Poor Credit & Bad Items among MHFA; No
History, for HOP applicants
3: Redocumentation Required every 120 days.
OTHER DELAYS (e.g., coordination, paperwork, const, etc)
Length of Processing: 3-6 months
LOCATION
Characterized by a heterogeneous population, Mission Hill has
housed an increasing number of students & young professions,
and has undergone significant "upscaling" in recent years.
SUGGESTIONS/SIRATEGIES
- select 3-4 times more pre-screened applicants than units.
- held first time buyer workshops.
- multi-lingual "how to buy a home" leaflets
Note: Price, Mortgage, Income and Closing Dates based on units
Sold as of 2/27/89, data from MHP HOP database.
All else based on Developer Surveys.
HOP SURVEY RESULTS BLUE HILL AVENUE - ROXBURY
1) # Unit Total ................. HOP................... 1
MHFA 3
Market 0
BRA 0
2) Average HOP 2 BDRM...........
3) Average MHFA 2 BDRM..........
Appraised.....
Price
Range
Mortgage
Income
Appraised.....
Price
Range
Mortgage
Income
.106,000
86, 000
86,000
81,700
33,072
.106,000
86,000-99,000
86,000-99,000
81, 700-94, 900
44, 000
4) MARKETING
# Applicants.................
# Lottery
# Initially Filled
Marketing Period
Lottery Date:
Units Sold As of 2/27/89:
Closing Date(s):
60
22 qualified, 4 selected
3
5/88
1 Low, 2 Mod
11/88
UNDERWRITING PROBLEMS
1: Housing Expense/Income Ratio - "narrow window"
2: Up Front Cash Requirements
3: Design Elements, e.g. use of electric heating
OTHER DELAYS (e.g., coordination, paperwork, const, etc)
Lengthy Project approval process
LOCATION
Somewhat rough neighborhood, subject to crime, drug problems.
SUGGESTIONS/STRATEGIES
- City can help primarily with soft costs, e.g., provide
eligible buyer lists.
- public sector should compensate for added risk incurred by
developers (in cutting costs by using, e.g., less experienced
contractors, alt. design elements). Expedite project approval.
Note: Price, Mortgage, Income and closing dates based on HOP units
Sold as of 2/27/89, data from MHP HOP database.
All Else Based on Developer Surveys.
HOP SURVEY RESULTS BRADFORD ESTATES - N DORCHESTER
1) # Unit Total ................. HOP..................16
MHFA 4
Market 26
BRA 0
2) Average HOP 2 BDRM..........
3) Average MHFA 3 BDRM.........
4) MARKETING
# Applicants.................
# Lottery
# Initially Filled
Marketing Period
Start:
Units Sold As of 2/27/89:
Closing Date(s):
Appraised...... 112, 500
Price 89,500
Range 89, 500-113, 000
Mortgage 83,900
Income 29,100
Appraised...... 116,000
Price 110,000
Range 110,000
Mortgage N.A.
Income 41,988
500-600 "Inquiries"
(no lottery)
Spring 1987
13 HOP, 2 MHFA
Spread over 1/88-1/89.
UNDERWRITING PROBLEMS
1: Up Front Cash Requirements (Gift Pymt rule)
2: Income sources--overtime, bonus treated inconsistently
3: Credit Problems (Poor Credit, Bad Item, No History)
OTHER DELAYS (e.g., coordination, paperwork, const, etc)
Length of Processing: 3-6 months
PMI company went bankrupt
(construction length: 8 months)
LOCATION
Somewhat rough neighborhood, subject to crime, drug problems.
SUGGESTIONS/STRATEGIES
- hired a Credit Consultant
- construction and Permanent Mtg Lenders should be the same
- support conmunity based movements such as Freedom House
Note: Price, Mortgage, Income and closing dates based on HOP units
Sold as of 2/27/89, data from MHP HOP database.
All Else Based on Developer Surveys.
HOP SURVEY RESULTS BRUSH HILL COMMONS - ROXBURY
1) # Unit Total ................. HOP..................... 4
MHFA 3
Market 7
BRA 0
2) Average HOP 3 BDRM...........
3) Average MHFA 2 BDRM..........
4) MARKETING
Appraised.......
Price
Range
Mortgage
Income
Appraised.......
Price
Range
Mortgage
Income
# Applicants.....................50 for all 15
# Lottery N.A.
# Initially Filled 4
Marketing Period
Start:
Units Sold As of 2/27/89:
Closing Date(s):
118,000-120,000
86,500
86500
81, 700
28,600
.122,000
97,500
97500
92,625
39,600
units, pre-screened
January 1988.
4 HOP, 2 MHFA
10/88-1/89
UNDERWRITING PROBLEMS
1: Credit History (poor history, bad items, no formal history)
2: Ratios: "narrow window" of eligibility
3: Finding a PMI that would insure 5% down loans
4: Up-front cash requirements
OTHER DELAYS (e.g., coordination, paperwork, const, etc)
Lengthy project and applicant approval processes.
Excessive Paperwork
5. LOCATION
Mission Hill has undergone considerable revitalization/
gentrification in recent years.
6. SUGGESTIONS/STRATEGIES
HOP units went faster than MHFA; market rate units went slowest
Note: Price, Mortgage, Income and Closing Iates based on units
Sold as of 2/27/89, data from MHP HOP database.
All else based on Developer Surveys.
1OP SURVEY RESULTS CODMAN CCMMONS - SOUTH DORCHESTER
1) # Unit Total ........... .... HOP.................6
MHFA 8
Market 24
BRA 0
2) Average HOP 3 BDRM...........
3) Average MHFA 2 BDRM..........
4) MARKETING
# Applicants ...............
# Lottery
# Initially Filled
Marketing Period
Lottery Date:
Units Sold As of 2/27/89:
Closing Date(s):
Appraised........109,000
Price 96, 000
Range -
Mortgage 85,000
Income 27,200
Appraised........109,000
Price 109,000
Range 103, 000-109, 000
Mortgage 97,850
Income 37,900
400 Original; 250 passed screening
10 selected
4 of 6 HOP units filled
N.A.
6 HOP, 3 MHFA
1/88-9/88
UNDERWRITING PROBLEMS
1: Juggling b/t Down Pymt & Debt/Income Ratio-"narrow window"
2: Applicant (especially recent immigrants) attributes -
Lack of credit history/2 years stable employment history in
U.S.; Cultural differences result in little banking history
OTHER DELAYS (e.g., coordination, paperwork, const, etc)
Bankers now want to see mktg done before releasing project
financing. Overly harsh interpretation of MHFA standards by
banks.
SUGGESTIONS/STRATEGIES
- uses a bank that is willing to bend more on documentation/
verification requirements (for non-HOP projects)
Note: Price, Mortgage, Income and Closing Dates based on units
Sold as of 2/27/89, data from MHP HOP database.
All else based on Developer Surveys.
HOP SURVEY RESULTS ROXBURY CROSSING - ROXBURY
1) # Unit Total ................. HOP....................22
MHFA 0
Market 0
BRA 0
2) Average HOP 4 BDRM...........
3) Average HOP 2 BDRM...........
Appraised........ 140,000
Price 105,000
Range 56, 000-110,000
Mortgage 98, 400
Income 34, 320
Appraised........
Price
Range
Mortgage
Income
140,000
88,000
N. A.
82, 700
28, 212
4) MARKETING
# Applicants ...........
# Lottery
# Initially Filled
Marketing Period
Start:
Units Sold As of 2/27/89:
Closing Date(s):
.260 passed thorough review
40 qualified for the 3 $56,000 units,
8 selected, all 8 plus two more
rejected.
January 1988.
3 HOP
3/89
UNDERWRITING PROBLEMS
1: Credit History (bad items, especially for lowest income)
2: Up-Front cash requirements
3: Income verification, sources
4: family size
OTHER DELAYS (e.g., coordination, paperwork, const, etc)
Lengthy project and applicant approval processes. Excessive
Paperwork. No bilingual staff at MHFA, no interaction between
MHFA and Buyer. Confusion about subsidy form, deed restriction.
5. LOCATION
High abandonment and vacancy rates. Bordered by conmercial,
institutional land uses. Considerable crime and drug problems.
6. SUGGESTIONS/STRATEGIES
- support community- based programs for credit counselling,
homeownership training.
- cut down on reporting requirements (consolidate PFD, MFHA forms)
Note: Price, Mortgage, Income and Closing Ds.tes based on units
Sold as of 2/27/89, data from MHP HOP database.
All else based on Developer Surveys.
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HOP SURVEY RESULTS SUMNER ST TOWNHOUSES - N DORCHESTER
1) # Unit Total................. HOP..................5
MHFA 5
Market 0
BRA 0
2) Average HOP 2 BDRM........... Appraised...... 116,000
Price 85,000
Range 85,000
Mortgage 80,800
Income 28,800
3) Average MHFA x BDRM.......... Appraised...... N.A.
Price 105000
Range 105000
Mortgage N.A.
Income N.A.
4) MARKETING
# Applicants.................265
# Lottery 40 qualified, 20 selected
# Initially Filled 3
Marketing Period
Lottery Date: Spring 88 (3 no. before const. completion)
Units Sold As of 2/27/89: 4 Low
Closing Iate(s): 1/89-2/89
UNDERWRITING PROBLEMS
1: Up Front Cash Requirements
2: Finding a PMI that would insure 5% down loans
3: MHFA would not allow a $5,000 sales concession
OI'HER DELAYS (e.g., coordination, paperwork, const, etc)
Lengthy approval process
Excessive Paperwork
Unclear roles and resposibilities of MHFA, PFD.
5. LOCATION
In the Uphams Corner/Savin Hill area. Older, fairly well
maintained neighborhood of duplexes, triplexes.
6. SUGGESTIONS/STRATEGIES
- City/State should sponsor an applicant clearinghouse.
- HOP easier to sell than MHFA. Lower Income applicants had
less credit history, therefore fewer credit problems.
Note: Price, Mortgage, Income and closing dates based on HOP units
Sold as of 2/27/89, data from MHP HOP database.
All Else Based on Developer Surveys.
CHAPTER 3 - SECONDARY MARKETS AND THE STANDARDIZATION OF
MORTGAGE UNDERWRITING
What has occured in the mortgage lending world that has made
it so difficult for prospective buyers of state sponsored homes
to obtain mortgage loans? Since the advent of mortgage lending,
financial intermediaries have underwritten mortgage loans on the
basis of particular loan, property and borrower attributes.
However, in today's lending environment, this judgemental process
of assessing "ability and willingness" to support a mortgage loan
has become simplified and roughly approximated due to the recent
wholesale commodification of mortgage loans through the secondary
mortgage markets.
Of increasing influence in establishing industrywide
underwriting standards have been the secondary market Federally
Sponsored Credit Agencies (FSCAs -- including Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac and Ginnie Mae) and the mortgage insurers they now require
for loans with less than 20% down payments. This chapter
describes the development and growth of national secondary
mortgage markets, the extent of rigidity they have introduced
into the mortgage underwriting process, and the empirical
evidence documenting the correlation between various underwriting
standards and the incidence of loan default. - First, however, a
short review of the nature of underwriting standards as a factor
of affordability is warranted.
Underwriting Guidelines and the First Time Buyer
The affordability of homeownership can be technically
described as a function of home prices, household incomes, up
front cash requirements (including down payments and closing
costs), interest rates, and type of loan instrument (e.g., fixed
rate versus adjustable rate or graduated payment mortgages). 1
As noted in the previous chapter, underwriting standards enter
the homeownership affordability equation by setting rules
regarding, for example:
- how much income a borrower can devote to housing
- what constitutes a stable or unstable source of income
- whether to allow co-borrowers or accept "gift money" toward
a down payment
- the amount of rent payments that an owner-occupant of a
multi-unit building must reserve for maintenance and repair
- how many units in a multi-unit project may have deed
restrictions
- and whether to underwrite alternative forms of housing such
as limited equity cooperatives
Essentially, when Fannie Mae issues a guideline that the
housing expense to income ratio for conventional loans should not
exceed 28%2, it is suggesting that past lending experience has
demonstrated this ratio to be related to a statistically
acceptable degree of risk of loan default. Any higher ratio
would presumably lead to greater probability of default or
1DiPasquele, p. 7.
21.e., monthly principle, interest, taxes and insurance--
"PITI"--divided by monthly income
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foreclosure since the borrower would have less income to devote
toward other necessary budget items. Adjustable rate and
graduated payment mortgages, which are thought to be riskier than
fixed interest payment mortgages, have an allowable housing
expense to income ratio of 25%.3
Similar reasoning underlies the conventional wisdom that
loan-to-value ratios over 80% are riskier because buyers have
less equity and personal investment involved, and hence are more
likely to "walk away" from a home and a mortgage obligation.
Thus, Fannie Mae requires primary mortgage insurance (PMI) for
all loans with less than 20% down payments, requires a minimam
down payment of 5%, and requires that down money come from a
household's savings or from immediate relatives.4
As a factor of affordability, underwriting standards can
significantly extend or limit access to mortgage credit among
first time buyers. The effects of even small changes in these
underwriting standards are summarized in Appendices II and III.
At a range of prices between $110,000 and $60,000, four
approximate, but consistant rules of thumb may be applied:
1) closing costs total about 5% of the loan amount (including
a 1.5% PMI premium). Thus:
- a 10% down loan requires up front cash of .15 x loan and
- a 5% down loan requires up front cash of .10 x loan
3FNMA Servicing Guidelines, 1986; VEREX Rate cards, 1986.
41bid
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2) a 5% decrease in down payments will reduce up front cash
requirements by 33%, but increase monthly expenses and
required income by 5%.
3) a 1% change in housing expense to income ratios leads to
a 3.5% change in required income, but no change in monthly
payments.
4) mortgage insurance (PMI) coverage, in addition to raising
up front cash requirements by 10%, raises monthly payments
and minimum qualifying incomes by 3%
By way of example, take the case of a $100,000 house,
financed with a 5% down payment and a $95,000 conventional
mortgage at a fixed rate of 10.0%. To qualify for this mortgage
loan, a family would need $46,000 under a 25% ratio, and $41,100
under a 28% ratio (see Appendix II). Similarly, a decrease in
the required down payment from 10% to 5% can reduce up front
cash requirements on a $100,000 home from roughly $15,000 to
$10,000 (see Appendix III). At the same time, however, the
larger mortgage amount associated with a lower downpayment will
raise income requirements by about five percent, or from $39,200
to $41,100 (Appendix II).
First time buyers are commonly considered more sensitive to
underwriting guidelines because of particular attributes which
make it difficult for them to demonstrate "ability and
willingness to pay" for a mortgage loan. Previous research has
traditionally emphasized younger households in the family
formation stage who have fewer savings to apply toward up-front
cash requirements; more frequent employment changes and shorter
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work histories; non-existant or poor formal credit histories; and
less income with which to support monthly payments. 5
As one scholar points out, the defining characteristics of
first-time homebuyers have been broadened in recent years to
reflect the "fact that the central issue is really the
affordability of homeownership". 6 Today, it is not just younger
families, but also newly arrived immigrants, single parents, dual
wage earner households, and long time residents of middle age and
middle incomes that share the same barriers of limited savings
and low incomes relative to home prices. Under such a situation,
the influence of underwriting standards becomes even more
apparent as greater numbers of households are pushed toward the
"margins" of underwriting limits.
The Development of a National Secondary Market
The institutionalization of industrywide underwriting
standards owes itself, in large part, to the establishment of the
quasi-governmental secondary mortgage market corporations. Prior
to the early 1970's, secondary mortgage markets were virtually
non-existant. The Savings and Loans Associations (SLAs) which
originated the vast majority of mortgage loans raised their funds
through the deposits of customers, made loans locally, and held
5Rosen, 1984, p 30.
6DiPasquele, 1988, p. 3.
mortgages in their portfolios until they were paid off. 7
But because of the long life of these assets, the
illiquidity of mortgage loans was perceived to create mortgage
credit mismatches characterized by shortages of mortgage funds in
somes areas, and surpluses in others. 8 At the root of cyclical
instability in mortgage supply were chronic episodes of
disintermediation, during which depositors moved their savings
from low-yielding passbook rates at SLAs to shorter term, higher
yield financial instruments (e.g., money market accounts) that
commercial banks or other financial institutions could offer.9
Federal regulation limiting interest rates on passbook
savings accounts and mortgage interest rates are generally
credited with introducing asset/liability mismatches and
liquidity problems for SLAs, who were obliged to carry long term
liabilities (mortgage loans) but unable to lenghthen the term of
their asset structures (savings deposits). In large part, the
secondary markets were fostered by federal government to provide
an outlet to SLAs, and increasingly to other mortgage loan
originators. By purchasing loans advancing mortgage money during
periods of tight credit, it was thought that the secondary market
7Freddie Mac, 1988, p. 6
2Ibid. See also Williams, pp 4-10.
9Ibid.
could smooth the disruptions of cyclical instability.10
While the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
had existed as early as 1938 to provide a steady outlet for
mortgage loans which were insured under the Federal Housing
Administration and Veteran's Authority (FHA/VA) programs, few
secondary market options for conventional or other residential
mortgage loans existed prior to 1968. In response to the chronic
credit mismatch, congress reorganized FNMA and chartered two new
organizations during 1968-1970 -- Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac--
to create a national secondary market outlet for conventional
home mortgages.
The purpose behind the establishment of these Federally
Sponsored Credit Agencies (FSCAs) was not only to redistribute
credit from surplus to deficit areas via purchases and cash
advances, but also to encourage investment in mortgages by
"nontraditional" investors, thus channelling greater proportions
of credit into mortgage markets. 11 The availability of the
secondary market option allows mortgage lenders to restructure
their asset portfolios by selling a portion of loans on the
secondary market and thus freeing up principle for reinvestment
in new residential mortgages or other activities.
10Williams, p. 13
llRosen, 1984, pp 108-109.
Each of these "secondary giants" is structured with slightly
different organizational types and responsibilities. Ginnie Mae
as a wholly owned government corporation under the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, was chartered to purchase FHA/VA
loans; Fannie Mae is a privately held corporation chartered to
purchase market rate loans (with the provision that a
substantial portion of purchases represent lower-income
households); and Freddie Mac was created by the Emergency Home
Finance Act of 1970 in the context of a "market gone bust and 9%
interest rates which seemed the end to mortgage lending". 12
In addition, the FSCAs are required to perform certain public
services by virtue of the public benefits these agencies enjoy
(for example, the ability to borrow funds from the federal
goverment on advantageous terms).13 According to Fannie Mae's
regulator, the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Fannie Mae is obliged to provide sufficient support for low and
moderate income families, and to provide sufficient capital to
inner city areas.14
Over the years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have gained
authority to issue mortgage backed securities for a variety of
12Fannie Mae, 1988, Freddie Mac, 1988, and Goetz, FHLMC at a
Conference on Secondary Markets, Washington D.C., 2/9/89.
13Hearth, 1983, p. 24.
14Ibid.
loan products and under various arrangements with loan
originators and servicers. Deregulation of the banking industry
(undertaken in part to circumvent disintermediation by loosening
restrictions on asset and liability structures of SLAs) has
encouraged new mortgage instruments such as graduated payment
mortgages (GPMs) and adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). As
deregulation has allowed savings and loans to diversify their
lending and investment activity, reducing their dependence on
long-term residential mortgage liabilities, the secondary market.
giants have developed new products to provide an outlet for these
loans.15
Today, a vast array of actors and complex products
characterizes the secondary market: under its Guarantor program,
Freddie Mac may "swap" mortgages originated by a thrift for
participations in a mortgage-backed security; a mortgage banker
may originate loans for sale to FNMA with pre-approval authority
and buyback provisions; investors, including financial
intermediaries, pension funds, insurance companies, and
invididuals, may purchase marketable securities backed by a
variety of mortgage loan instruments; Freddie Mac may issue a
Collateralized Mortgage Obligation", a mortgage backed security
with call protection (ie, investor protection against sudden loan
prepayments); and state housing finance agencies such as the
Commonwealth's MHFA may issue bonds and uses the proceeds from
15Williams, 1987, p. 7
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these bonds to finance both general mortgages and mortgages for
prioritized purposes.16
Despite the complex array of secondary market operations,
most of these operations conform to the general "originate,
service, and sell" model illustrated in Table V. Entitled after
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's motto, "Connecting Main Street to
Wall Street", the chart illustrates the stream of mortgage
payments from borrower to investor on the top tier; the bottom
tier show the cash flow resulting from purchases and sales of
mortgage loans. The price paid by a secondary broker for a
mortgage loan pool is a function of the expected cash flows
associated with that mortgage. In deciding whether to hold
loans in their portfolios, lenders and investors alike compare
yields on mortgage loans with other investments. The riskier a
loan or security is perceived to be, the greater its yield, or
expected cash flow value must be to compensate for this risk.
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, which has issued
residential mortgage bonds since the early 1970s, functions
similarly, although it does not have the wide array of CMO,
passthrough and other products used by the national secondary
giants. In recent years, bond series have been issued about
twice a year for three designated purposes: general lending,
16Fannie Mae, 1988, Freddie Mac 1988, Williams, 1987, MHFA,
1988.
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The Secondary Mortgage Market: "Connecting Main Street to Wall Street"
Source: Freddie Mac "Citizens Guide to the Secondary Mortgage Market', 12/88
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Mortgage LanS Investors
prioritized lending for lower income buyers, and new construction
lending for 1-4 family dwellings. The most recent issue in
February 1989, for example, provides $40 million in loan funds at
7.9%, or about 400 mortgages for $100,000 homes each.17
As was noted, the secondary market agencies function to
provide a certain level of protection against lending risk, as
these agencies guarantee payments to investors. While only GNMA
carries a guarantee backed by the full force of the U.S.
Government (FNMA and FHLMC carry only the guarentee of those
agencies), all three FCSAs in effect carry the status of
government backed securities in practice, and each has recently
had "AAA" Standard and Poor ratings.1 8
For loans with limited down payments, another feature of the
secondary market is the requirement for mortgage insurance to
cover the additional risk attributed to loans with higher Loan-
to-value ratios. These mortgage insurers have included (and
currently include) the Federal Housing Authority and Veteran 0 s
Administration insurance programs (which guarentee repayment of
100% of the loan amount) and private primary mortgage insurance
companies (PMIs), which generally insure against loss on the
17MHFA Official Statement For Series 7 Revenue Bonds, dated
2/16/89.
18Williams, 1987 and Hines, 1988.
first 20-30% of the loan amount. 1 9 Thus, the underwriting
standards of these mortgage insurers play heavily into the degree
of homeownership access afforded to households with lower income
and little wealth for down payments. The underwriting history
and risk experience of these insuring agents will be returned to
shortly.
Magnitude/Extent of Penetration of the Secondary Market
By almost any stretch of the imagination, the volume of
sales and puchases of residential mortgages on the secondary
market is huge, and the relatively quick penetration of secondary
markets into the mortgage lending environment has also been
phenomenal:
Well over 80 percent of the conventional mortgages made since
the 1970s, when Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae began introducing
uniform documents, are standardized. 2 0
Consider also the explosive growth in the volume of loans
sold on the secondary market: In 1960, Fannie Mae, the largest
secondary agency, bought $3 billion in mortgage loans; by 1985,
mortgage lenders sold $160 billion in mortgages on the secondary
market; in both of 1986 and 1987, they sold roughly $300 billion
in mortgages. 2 1  As Tables V (a-b) indicate, thrifts, mortgage
19Hines, p. 156.
20Freddie Mac, 1988, pp 13 & 17.
2 lFreddie Mac, pp 1-5. See also Hearth, 1983, for earlier figures.
TABLE Va.
Originations of Mortgage Loans
By Originator, 1987
(Total Originations: $380 billion)
Other (2.7%)
Mtg Bkrs (23.0%)
HFA 's* (1. 4%)
Banks (25.5%)
S:Ls** (46.7%)
FSCAs*** (. 6%)
* State and Local Housing Finance Authorities
** Includes Savings and Loans and Mutual Svgs. Banks
*** Federally Sponsored Credit Agencies
Source: Freddie Mac "A Citizen's Guide", 1988.
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TABLE Vb.
Sales of Mtg Backed Securities
By Issuer, 1987
(Total Sales: $330 billion)
Private** (22.6%)
Other* (0.6%)
FHLMC (22.6%)
FNMA (22.9%)
CNMA (27.7%)
State & Local (3.6%)
* Other Federal Agencies
** Private Issuers
TABLE Vc.
Purchases of Mtg Backed Securities
By Buyer, 1987
(Total Purchases: $350 billion
Other (40.7%)
LICs*** (16.4%)
*
**
Thrifts* (23.4%)
/Banks (11.6%)
/
Pensions (7. 9%)
Includes Mutual Savings Bks and Svgs. and Loans
Other Firms and Individual Investors
Life Insurance Companies
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bankers and commercial banks account for most of the loan
originations and sales, while the federal agencies account for
the majority of secondary market purchases. Reflecting post-
deregulation diversification of financial institution's
investments, the proportion of loans originated by SLAs and
commercial banks and mortgage banking companies have nearly
reversed since 1975, when SLAs originated roughly 55% of all
mortgage loans and the latter two financial institutions
originated 35% of all mortgage loans. Among the ultimate
investors of mortgage-related securities are thrifts, banks, life
insurance companies and pension funds (Table V c).
While levels of certain types of secondary activity, such as
FHA/VA lending has been low in Boston relative to other
regions 22, by all accounts the vast majority of loans made in the
Boston area are also sold on the secondary market. Linda
Bullard, who directs Shawmut Bank's role as Master Lender for the
Massachusetts Housing Partnership's HOP program, estimates that
in recent years, Shawmut has portfoliod 10 to 15% of its
residential mortgage loans. Moreover, 100% of these portfoliod
loans are ARMs - "with interest rate volatility, no banker is
willing to hold 30 year fixed mortgages -- that's how the thrifts
got into so much trouble". 23
2 2 e.g., Freddie Macs outstanding volume of FHA/VA loans in
the New England area totalled $23 million, compared to $585 for
the mid-south region, and $282 million for the deep south.
23Interview, Linda Bullard, 4/3/89.
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Renee Beatty, State Manager for CitiCorp Mortgage Company,
notes that portfolio holdings are almost nil for mortgage
companies (who do not have their own capital to make loans) such
as CitiCorp's, noting that Fannie Mae has purchased the vast
majority of their residential mortgage loans. 2 4  Both the Bank
of Boston and the Bank of New England have also indicated that
they are reluctant to approve loans which are likely to pose
difficulty in sale on the secondary market, including loans for
innovative forms of housing tenure, such as limited equity
cooperative housing. 25  Even those who market real estate in
Boston claim that the effects of the secondary mar'cet penetration
here have led to a situation in which they "will do anything to
get a lender to portfolio a loan".2 6
Since they were established over ten years ago, there has
been considerable debate as to whether or not the existence of
the secondary giants actually does serve to increase the volume
of mortgage credit. Conclusions of most recent studies tend to
agree that a considerable amount of secondary mortgage market
activity is offset by reductions in primary portfolio lending.
2 4Interview, Renee Beatty, 4/89
25Meetings on Coop Housing with the Massachusetts Urban
Reinvestment Group and Bank of New England, 2/89; and with MURAG
and Indianhead Bank, 10/88.
2 6 Interview, Martha Dewaney, Marketing Agent for Saaks
Realty and for the HOP Sumner Street project, 4/89.
Testing this hypothesis in 1983, for example, Douglas Hearth
found that the upward pressure on interest rates activated by
FSCA purchases and debt financing "crowded out" primary
investment in mortgage loans. 27
The Standardization of Mortgage Underwriting Guidelines
Whatever the effect of the secondary giants on the volume of
mortgage credit, no one disputes the effect that secondary market
operations have had on the standardization of underwriting
guidelines and uniformity of mortgage lending practices.
The fact of the matter, one which FNMA and GNMA proudly and
frequently remind us of, is that secondary markets and mortgage
insurance cannot exist in absence of standardized underwriting
guidelines. In order to get the secondary market off and
running, the secondary giants recognized that they would need to
introduce this uniformity so that pools of mortgages could be
valued and "sold wholesale to investors"l28 who knew what they
were buying. During the 1970s, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
developed and promoted a uniform set of standards which are today
known throughout the industry as "underwriting guidelines":
For conventional mortgages, they developed "uniform
2 7Hearth, Douglas, Federal Intervention in the Mortgage
Markets: An Analysis, UMI Research Press: Ann Arbor, MI, 19833.
pp 5-6.
28Freddie Mac quote, 1988 p. 10.
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instruments", standard mortgage documents for use in every
state in the union. They developed standard "underwriting
guidelines", a checklist for use by lenders when qualifying
the credit of would be homeowners. They developed standard
appraisal forms for evaluating properties. And they
introduced requirements for mortgage insurance to help protect
investors from losses due to homeowners who default. 29
In order to process the growing volumes of loan purchases over
the years, the secondary giants have computerized the loan
underwriting process by assigning a score to each mortgage
according to the degree of risk it carries.
This system allows the corporation to buy an immense volume of
mortgages without sacrificing the quality of the mortgages it
buys. The proof of their effectiveness lies in the
corporation's statistics for credit losses. Freddie Macs are
consistantly below industry average. 30
The question arising in this thesis concerns the extent to
which this wholesale commodification of mortgage lending has
affected the ability of moderate income households to obtain
mortgage financing in Boston. Whatever the exact standard or
geographic area of impact of the secondary market, the tendency
is to move from a case-by-case consideration of not-so easily
identifiable risk factors to an easily-applied norm having
statistically acceptable margins of error. Thus, what is
efficient for the lender, underwriter, and investor in terms of
risk probability becomes "averaged" or "typified" in a manner
2 9 Freddie Mac, "A Citizen's Guide to the Secondary Mortgage
Market, 12/88. p 10.
30Ibid, p. 26.
which in all probability reduces the ablility of the underwriter
to take into account the exigencies of the particular buyer,
project, development costs, and regional housing markets and
overall economic conditions.
This "commodification" of mortgage loans and its impact on
the nature of lending has been recognized by all authors writing
on the subject, whether they believe secondary markets to, on
balance, increase the supply of credit or not. As Rosen notes,
today "the mortgage market has to be discussed and analyzed for
the most part in national terms because regional and
intrametropolitan effects are largely nonexistent due to the
highly fungible nature of financial credit".31 M.A. Hines, on
the other hand, who contends that secondary markets do increase
the flow of mortgage credit, still notes that "capital markets
are much more impersonal [than credit markets]. The borrowers
securities must meet the needs of the investors while at the same
time serving the purposes of the borrower. The capital market,
in other words, is more investor motivated than borrower
motivated. "32
Even loans made through the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency, which one might presume to be more sensitive to regional
markets, are closely tied to national secondary markets in at
3lRosen, 1984. p. 41.
32Hines, 1988 p. 2.
least three respects:
1) banks who originate and service MHFA loans must also be Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac approved lenders, or have prior experience
with MHFA.33
2) Investors of MHFA mortgage bonds sold nationwide, MHFA
contends, demand the same amount of security from risk as FSCA-
backed securities, and thus they are bound to the same or similar
risk-related underwriting standards 34
3) MHFA, like the FSCAs, requires PMI for all mortgages of
greater than 75% loan-to-value ratios, thus they are restricted
to the standards of these national underwriters as well. 35
This last connection to secondary markets is particularly
onerous as the number of PMIs who provide insurance services has
fallen from some 15 companies in the early 80's to some 4-5
companies today. Moreover, experts at Fannie Mae, PMIs and banks
alike agree that only two of these PMIs -- General Electric
Mortgage Insurance Company (GEMIC) and Mortgage Guarantee
33MHFA Single Family Programs Operations Manual, 9/88,
Eligibility Guide, Part 2, Section 1 (e) and (h).
3 4 conversations with MHFA staff (Carol Asklund and Frank
Sorenson), PMI representatives (Bill Schumann), and Freddie Mac
Representatives (John Hempschoot).
35MHFA Loan Servicing Guidelines, 1988.
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Insurance Company (MGIC) -- continue to insure 5% down loans.3 6
Underwriting Rigidity and the Question of Risk
While both secondary giants and banks attest to the
tremendous extent of market penetration of secondary operations,
there is considerable disagreement as to how flexible the
underwriting standards that secondary giants and PMIs issue are.
What degree of variation from the standards can or is tolerated
by secondary giants and ultimate mortgage investors?
John Mempschoot, director of underwriting for Freddie Mac,
agrees that because of the volumes of loans processed and the
percentage of these which are securitized, "mortgage underwriting
has become a very mechanical process" . But FHLMC, he maintains,
has strived to convey the message to mortgage lenders that the
agency is "very flexible". The loans that are less appropriate
for securitization, Hempschoot stressed, are those which induce
variation in the stream of income which is channelled through to
investors -- for example, balloon payment or graduated payment
loans.37
However, Hempschoot maintains that FHLMC can be flexible
with regard to income ratios, allowing higher ratios in areas
36Ibid.
37Interview, Hempschoot, 4/89.
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with high market rents and prices; it has purchased loans
involving sweat equity; and typically allows grants for "soft
second" mortgages on local housing authority projects. "The
feeling that banks can't impact the credit assessment process is
wrong". Why then, do banks seem to shy away from "non-
conforming" loans? Hempschoot replies that "this is an
educational function that our office needs to work on".3 8
While FHLMC integrates its policy for purchasing non-
conforming loans as a part of its overall operations, FMNA has
dealt with the flexibility problem differently by setting up a
separate office specifically for the purpose of tailoring
products for low and moderate income housing to meet local needs.
Some of the alternatives the Office of Low and Moderate Income
Housing offers include equity investments, mortgage purchases for
community development projects, and purchases of state or
municipal mortgage revenue bonds. Martin Levine, the office's
Director, maintains that the Office encourages special deals, has
been working on a system with which to value sweat equity, and
has loosened ratios somewhat.39  Of particular interest in the
Boston context are two stated program elements: the willingness
to buy loans from local housing partnerships which entail soft
second mortgages (for example, for closing costs and
downpayments); and the willingness to exceed ratios in certain
38 Ibid
39Conversation with Martin Levine, 2/89.
cases, specifically, "when borrowers have consistantly and
successfuly devoted greater portions of their income to rent and
shown and ability to accumulate savings".4 0  However, as will be
noted, rents in Boston are so high that housing-to-income ratios
of 30, 35, and 40% may make it impossible for households to also
save for downpayments; and this is particularly true at lower
income levels, where fewer dollars remain for other essentials.
Moreover, while in theory Fannie Mae will make deals on non-
conforming loans, bankers often note that "they've been saying
that for years, and yet have demonstrated little" 4 1 . It is
difficult to obtain data on the volume of non-confurming and
lower income loans as a percent of the FSCA's total (in-house and
securitized) portfolios. Fannie Mae representatives note that "a
substantial portion of loans are originated on home prices below
$60,000"42; however, this indicates very little in the Boston
context, where few habitable homes sell for this price. In
1978, findings of HUD research indicated that Fannie Mae was
performing poorly in its obligations to support low income and
inner city lending. 43 The Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment
40Fannie Mae "Low and Moderate Income Programs", 1989, p. 25.
41John Sullivan, at a meeting on cooperative housing with
the Bank of New England and Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment
Advisory Group.
42Conference on Secondary Mortgage Markets and Local Housing
Programs, February 9, 1989.
43Hearth, 1983, p. 24.
Advisory Group has recently engaged in research determing that
total low and moderate income loans are likely to be well below
the charter law's requirements (which were at one point set at
greater than 50%), and that HUD, in whom the authority is vested,
has failed to set these requirements from time to time.44
Given the current affordability gap which requires tens of
thousands of dollars of subsidy to reach moderate income
households, the task of FNMA has become impossible outside of
special deals for non-conforming loans and local affordable
housing programs. Yet, none of the 50-odd "deals" represented in
Fannie Mae's Low and Moderate Office handbook include
Massachusetts projects. And of the project types being
represented, few pertain to the ratio, limited downpayment, and
limited equity at issue in the Boston context. 45
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency has also introduced
specific products to better meet local needs. A share loan
program for limited equity cooperatives, for example, provides
mortgage financing for affordable homes produced by the
Greenfield Area Land Trust.4 6 With interest rates some 2 points
44Conversations with, Mary O'Hara, President of the
Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group.
45Fannie Mae, "Low and Moderate Income Housing Initiatives,
1989.
46 Community Economics, newsletter of the Institute for
Community Economics, Spring 1989.
89
below market rates, MHFA loans have also presumably been able to
reach a lower-income population than FNMA or FHLMC, and the state
agency also reserves a portion of bond issues for "high-priority"
lower-income households. But to a large extent, they are still
tied to the requirements of primary mortgage insurance companies,
who are noted by developers, bankers and secondary giants alike
as the most rigid of all with respect to underwriting
requirements. Carol Asklund, MHFA Underwriting Manager, notes
that "Since we're selling mortgage revenue bonds on the secondary
market, we've made certain representations to both our investors
and the bond raters (Moody's). In this sense, we're largely tied
to the same underwriting and documentation requirements of Fannie
Mae and of the PMIs who insure our 10% and 5% down loans". 4 7 An
estimated 80% of all MHFA loans require PMI.48
Underwriting Standards and the Question of Risk - FHA vs. PMIs
Because the mortgage credit in question for this study
pertains to mortgage loans for high (over 90%) loan to value
ratios, the relevant underwriting standards in question are
largely those used by mortgage insurance institutions which
underwrite the additional risk usually associated with these
loans.
47Interview with Carol Asklund, 5/1/89.
48Interview, Frank Sorenson, MHFA, 4/89.
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Acceptable coverage as defined by the FSCAs includes
coverage provided under the FHA/VA Title II Section 203 program,
or coverage by a qualified private PMI company. The primary
evidence relating to the risk associated with the lower-equity
loan, more moderate income buyer, and looser debt to income
ratios thus centers around FHA and PMI insured loans. Both
because of the alternate markets these groups are viewed as
serving, and because of the difference in the nature of their
underwriting policy, these two secondary market loan
underwriters provide a good basis from which to hypothesize about
risk. While no future probability of risk for particular loans
is estimated in this thesis, the historic experience of these
mortgage insurers (and to a less extent the FSCAs) with loan
defaults provides a broad indication of the additional default
which might be expected under marginal underwriting changes, and
the costs associated with those defaults.
The Emergence and Growth of Mortgage Insurance
The FHA Title II Insurance Program was created in 1934 for
the purpose of insuring mortgage lenders against loss due to
default, and thus increasing the flow of credit into mortgage
lending.49 PMI companies emerged with the establishment of the
Mortgage Guarantee Insurance Corporation (MGIC) in 1956.50 PMIs
49HUD, 1986, pp 1-5.
50Hines, 1987, p. 178.
have grown popular more recently, largely due to the secondary
market's establishment of an outlet for conventional (non-FHA)
loans with private mortgage insurance.
Both PMIs and FHA charge borrowers a premium for insurance
on loans. FHA has recently charged a flat fee of 3.8% of the
loan amount, amortized over the life of the loan.5 1  General
Electric Mortgage Insurance Company's latest rates for 5% down
buyers are 1.5% for the first year, and .5% amortized for each
year thereafter.5 2 GE, like most PMIs, covers the top 30% of the
loan value, while FHA insures the entire loan amount. 53
In general, FHA underwriting standards have been
considerably more flexible and less restrictive than those of
either PMIs or FSCAs. For example, FHA's ratio guidelines in
recent years have been set at 38% for housing expenses, and 50%
for total debt expenses.5 4 Also, when FHA's loan-to-value ratios
are calculated relative to total acquisition costs including
closing costs, a substantial portion of loans originated by the
agency have effective LTVs of close to or even greater than
10O%.55 It has been a conscious policy of the agency to assume
51HUD, 1986.
52GEMIC Rate Card, dated 4/88.
53Ibid, and HUD, 1986.
54HUD, 1986.
55Ibid
somewhat higher risk probabilities while maintaining the self-
supporting and solvent nature of the agency. This is achieved by
allowing more flexible standards while instituting other more
careful screening processes which consider a greater number of
loan variables, including "compensating" factors which might
offset loans thought to be higher risk (e.g., low down-payment
loans).56
While FHA standards have become even more relaxed in recent
years, these loans have generally been unavailable to Boston
residents due to the low maximum acquisition price allowed by
FHA; until 1984, the maximum loan amount which could be insured
by FHA was 90,000. Thus, in past years, the proportion of
insured loans in Boston which are covered by FHA have accounted
for less than 5% of all insured loans nade in the city, compared
to FHA market shares of 20% or more in lower priced housing
markets.57
The PMI companies which have subsequently become the only
alternative of local lower equity buyers ( and to a lesser extent
FNMA) have adopted more restrictive standards in recent years.
These difference in trends toward flexibility must be understood
in the context of the insurer's respective risk requirements,
underwriting processes and default experience.
56HUD, 1986, p. 5.3.
57Ibid.
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Recent Loss Experience and Tighter Underwriting Standards
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, as PMIs enjoyed
tremendous growth rates, many began loosing credit restrictions,
insuring new mortgage instruments such as graduated payment
mortgages, and expanding business in rapidly growing markets in
the U.S. and overseas.5 8 Some raised their allowable housing to
income ratios up to 33%, 35% or even higher during this period.59
However, when the affordability crunch hit with the
worldwide recession of the early 80's, skyrocketing interest
rates and depressed local economic conditions led to widespread
occurance of "negative amortization" on high loan-to-value loans;
since GPM and ARM payments were increasing (in unregulated
fashion) payments faster than incomes, many buyers were unable to
make payments. 60 In areas where housing markets were saturated
and home values declining (e.g., in Houston, Dallas, Detroit, and
other economies characterized by extreme depression or a "bust
boom" cycle), PMIs, FSCAs, and FHA/VA all realized increased
claims and losses on recent mortgages. Fannie Mae was losing $1
million a day 6l; the FHA default rate increased from roughly 2.5%
58HUD/FHA, 1987, and DiPasquele, 1988.
59Ibid
6 0Rohde, 1982.
6 lGoetz, V.P. of FHLMC, at a Conference on Secondary
Markets, Washington D.C., 2/89.
to 9%; and the PMI default rate increased sixfold from .5% to
3%62.
As a result, FNMA and many PMIs have adopted lower debt to
income ratio requirements (FNMA switched from 28% to 25% for
higher LTVs in late 1985, and several PMIs followed suit), and
more recently, fewer PMIs have been willing to cover 5% down
loans. 6 3 While most of the 15 existing PMIs covered 5% down
loans in the early 80s, only two are known to insure them today,
including MGIC and GE Mortgage Insurance Corporation. 6 4 In
addition, many PMIs began to require increased documentation to
verify income (e.g., through two years of tax returns, and, in
questionable cases, an additional 8 weeks of paycheck stubs);
"hard copy" credit reports (which are most detailed and take
longer to obtain than "soft" copy reports which can be obtained
in a day with the help of an on-line computer modum);
requirements for 2 months of PITI in a reserve escrow for loans
with low down payments; and a complex formula requiring
purchasers of 2 and 3-family homes to calculate maintenance
reserves. 65 More recently, credit reports have been extended by
62HUD/FHA, 1986, p. 5.5.
6 3HUD, 1986, p. 5.1, and Conversations with William
Schumann, Old Republic Insurance Corporation, FNMA staff, and
Frank Sorenson, MFHA.
6 4Ibid
6 5Interviews with Carol Asklund, Linda Bullard; and
VEREX/GEMIC rate cards, 1986.
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three years, requiring households to remember why a particular
payment was past due as long as ten years ago. 66
Part of this rigidity may be attributed to the fact that
because they deal primarily in mortgages with loan-to-value
ratios of 90% and under, PMIs have less diversified holdings with
which to insulate themelves from the exigencies of the market.
But many academics and practitioners feel that the recent
restrictions adopted by PMIs and income ratio restrictions
adopted in recent years (including decreases in allowable income
ratios, increased documentation and verification of income and
debt) are not an accurate reflection of risk: "they were a knee-
jerk reaction to losses of the early 80's which resulted from
conditions in specific markets and for poorly designed mortgage
instruments." 67
Anita Champ, Director of Loan Servicing Standards of Fannie
Mae, also notes that the Agency now acknowledges that losses of
the early 80's were due to "oil patch economies" and other
structural economic factors, and that little default experience
has been tied directly to higher debt/income ratios. 6 8  These
views concur with the findings of a recent FHA study which
compares FHA/VA borrower and loan characteristics and default
66 Interview, Linda Bullard, 4/3/89.
67Conversation with John Hempschoot, FHLMC, 4/89.
6 8Interview, 2/9/89
experience among FHA and PMIs. Like most previous literature,
the study found that for both PMI's and FHA, defaults have been
higher for loans with lower down payments. 69 Also like former
studies, findings on the correlation between higher debt-to-
income ratios and default experience has been less conclusive,
with defaults sometimes representing higher, and sometimes lower
ratio buyers.70 For FHA originattions, buyers with lower debt
ratios have had higher than average rates of default, and buyers
with high debt ratios have had lower than average rates of
default, in 1977, 1979, and 1981.71 The Agency attributes this
difference to the more complete screening performed on higher
ratio buyers. 7 2
Of crucial importance, however, the study notes, are the
structural economic conditions surrounding mortgage lending.
This importance can be illustrated most clearly by the upsurge in
default rates, which were highly regional in nature, during the
worst years of this country's last recession, 1980-1982. For
FHA and PMI insured loans, default rates are higher in
metropolitan areas with lower housing appreciation rates (below
69HUD, 1986, Chapter 5. See also Hearth, 1983; Rosen, 1984;
Hines, 1988.
7 0 Ibid
71Ibid
7 2 Ibid
4.5%) and high unemployment rates.~7 3
Contrary to the rest of the nation, however, Massachusetts
began to experience economic recovery much sooner, and both
incomes and home values were increasing rapidly during this
time.74 Home price appreciation rates in Boston ranged between
10% and 30% per year during the early 80's. 75 , and default rates
were low. The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, for example,
has to date paid out roughly $26 million dollars in PMI premiums
on 80% of $1 billion of loans. Of this $26 million in premiums,
the PMIs have paid out only $100,000 in claims to PMIs over the
last several years.7 6 As Frank Sorenson of the MHFA notes, "the
PMIs tell us that Massachusetts, and for that matter all of New
England, are paying for loan losses that occured in Dallas,
Houston, Detroit, and so on".77
Summary
Due to the high liquidity of mortgage loans made possible by
the secondary mortgage market, mortgage credit markets have been
subsumed under national capital markets in recent years. The
73HUD, p. 5.10.
74BRA, 1988.
75Ibid
76Frank Sorenson, MHFA
77Ibid.
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transfer of mortgage loans into marketable securities requires
mortgage loans to compete on a national scale directly with a
broad range of marketable securities, including stocks, bonds,
and corporate debentures. By-products of this new mortgage
lending environment are the creation of standardized underwriting
guidelines and the increased difficulty of approving non-
conforming loans and low equity loans for sale to investors in
the secondary market.
This commodification of mortgage loans has led to a
situation in which individual borrowers are judged by nationally
uniform standards, and in recent years, these standards have
become increasingly restrictive in response to high default rates
of the early 80's. However, while scholars and practitioners
alike agree that this default experience was due primarily to
structural or macroeconomic forces (namely, the largest worldwide
recession since the Great Depression), Fannie Mae and PMIs have
reacted largely by instituting microeconomic underwriting
amendments -- for example, by decreasing maximum allowable debt
to income ratios, and increasing documentation and verification
requirements.
Low income, low equity borrowers, who are thought to be
higher risks than wealthier borrowers with larger down payments,
have borne the brunt of these amendments in recent years: In the
process of adopting stricter underwriting policies intended to
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restrict mortgage credit from higher risk borrowers, these
underwriters close the door to credit access for many buyers who
might otherwise exhibit "ability and willingness" to support a
mortgage loan. This indirect impact on access to credit among
presumably creditworthy households was most vividly demonstrated
through the HOP experience. The next chapter, Chapter 4, lends
further indications that present underwriting standards may
exclude many otherwise eligible homebuyers.
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CHAPTER 4 - UNDERWRITING STANDARDS IN THE BOSTON CONTEXT
What is special about the Boston context and Boston's
moderate income households that both point to a need for and the
appropriateness of more flexible and regionally responsive
underwriting standards? At root, it is the city's (and for that
matter, the New England region's) unaffordable housing market
which makes national -underwriting standards appear relatively
restrictive in the Boston context, and provides rationale for
reforming these standards locally.
The HOP experience demonstrated that the availability of
mortgage credit in these neighborhoods is requisite to opening
homeownership access to moderate income groups. There are
several factors about the Boston population and the proposed
underwriting amendments which suggest that opening credit markets
to lower income neighborhoods needn't mean that lenders resign
themselves to doing "bad business" or making charitable
contributions at all. In fact, with marginal changes in current
underwriting standards and some commitment on the part of loan
originators and underwriters to consider new underwriting
processes and criteria, lenders could conceivably tap large
markets of latent, creditworthy homebuyers.
Although risk analysis is not within the scope of this
thesis, there are several aspects about the Boston housing
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market, HOP projects, and Boston's moderate income households
which suggest that more flexible underwriting standards can also
be justified from the standpoint of risk. On the "macro" level,
two structural aspects of Boston's economy suggest this City to
have a less risky mortgage lending market than the average
metropolitan area, including the city's low unemployment rates
and high home appreciation rates. Between 1984 and 1987,
Massachusetts has enjoyed one of the lowest unemployment rates of
the nation's industrial states.1 Still below 4%, Boston still
enjoys the lowest unemployment rate in a state that compares
favorably to others vis-a-vis total employment. 2
Boston's homeowners have also enjoyed tremendous appreciation
rates in recent years: Appreciation rates for Dorchester
subneighborhoods, for example, have ranged from 7% to 93% between
1982 and 1985. Typical rates of appreciation in nearly all
neighborhoods were upward of 30% during this period, and lower
income neighborhoods have had some of the highest appreciation
rates of all (see Table VI). These rates are extremely high
compared to the FHA's definition of high appreciation markets
with average rates of 4% or greater.3 While the Assessor's
office and Boston Redevelopment Authority note that these rates
have dropped somewhat in recent years, they also agree that the
1Greiner, p. 12.
2Boston Globe, 5/23/89 and Greiner, p. 12.
3see HUD, 1986.
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TABLE V I
Appreciation Rates of Boston Homes, By Ward
1985 Constant Dol lars
1981- 1982- 1983- 1984-
1982 1983 1984 1985
East Boston 25$ 39% 39% 305
Charlestown 23% 26% 49% 31%
Downtown -11% 40% 93% 36%
South End/Fenway -8% 43% 37% 31%
Back Bay/Beacon 1% 67% 7% 45%
S Boston (N) 29% 42% 24% 28%
S Boston (S) 33% 37% 2% 22%
Roxbury-City Hosptt 0% 12% 1% 41%
Roxbury-Madison Pk -9% 115% 10% 67%
Parker Hill/Mission Hill 14% 24% 53% 48%
Rox-Egleston Sq 20% 56% 22% 33%
Rox-Washington Pk 14% 12% 36% 39%
Dorchester - Savin Hill 5% 44% 30% 49%
Dorchester - Franklin Fid 22% 17% 31% 93%
Dorchester (N Central) -4% 56% 36% 57%
Dorchester-Pt Norfolk 5% 39% 31% 7%
Dorchester-Pierce Sq 7% 31% 45% 24%
Hyae Pk/Mattapan 12% 38% 28% 2%
Jamaica Plain/Rosllndale 13% 41% 22% 1%
W Roxbury/Roslindale 8% 30% 41% 10%
Brighton 4% 48% 67% 55%
Allston/Brighton 14% 30% 48% 22%
Boston 10% 38% 33% 36%
Source: BRA 1988 Housing: An informational Report.
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outlook for higher than average (relative to other major
metropolitan areas) appreciation rates is good.4
These two aspects of Boston's economy are the type of
"structural" or "macro" considerations that are considered
theoretically and empirically to be among the most important risk
determinants. Yet, they appear to have little bearing upon
underwriting decisions in the Commonwealth: again, as Frank
Sorenson of the MHFA notes, "PMI's tell us that Massachusetts and
New England are paying for losses that occured in [depressed
market areas outside New England]".5
It should be pointed out that recent appreciation rates and
unemployment rates are not necessarily good predictors of
Boston's future economic performance, and bankers reflect this
fact in their current nervousness about the future of the economy
and about all loans, particularly real estate loans. Many
business leaders agree that the Massachusetts regional economy
will enjoy positive, though slower, growth and stress that a
slowdown from phenomenal growth levels does not imply the
beginning of a "bust" cycle similar to that experienced by the
"oil patch" economies. 6  Massachusett's economy, which is much
4Conversations with John Avault, BRA and George Moses, City
of Boston Assessing Department .
5 1nterview, Frank Sorenson, 5/1/89.
6 Boston Globe, Survey of Business Leaders, 5/23/89.
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more diversified, is probably not as susceptible to volatile
world markets.
Moreover, because affordably priced housing markets are
often isolated from overall regional markets 7 , one should view
current nervousness about residential real estate markets
skeptically: demand for luxury-priced condominiums or
commercial office space may be saturated, while demand for
moderately priced and alternative forms of housing, which have
been largely unfunded by private financial intermediaries, could
remain very strong. Given the tremendous response to HOP units,
and the current unaffordability of market rate homes to Boston's
moderate income households, this appears to be exactly the case.
There are several "micro" related underwriting concerns
which also suggest that higher ratio, lower down payment buyers
of HOP units might be less risky in Boston than similar buyers
under different circumstances. First, HOP units themselves tend
to have a built in protection against loss due to default: As
was noted in the HOP Project Summary Tables (see pp 58-64), the
appraised values of HOP units are some 15-35% higher than the
sales value of these units. Generally, what this means is that
despite the low down payments of HOP buyers, there is a built in
equity factor from an underwriting standpoint: In the worst case
7both by nature of their conveyence to targetted community
members, and by the deliberate efforts of community based housing
developers to keep these units off the market.
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scenario, if a HOP unit should require foreclosure proceedings
and resale, this difference between market (appraised) value and
loan amount creates a hedge against the possibility of monetary
loss to the lender or loan insurer. In other words, given a
$30,000 difference between loan amount and appraised value, an
average cost of default at 11,000 8 would be covered several times
over, assuming the unit sold near its appraised value. It is
noteworthy that similar affordable housing projects with limited
equity provisions have reportedly very low rates of default,
including those of the Institute for Community Economics (which
has initiated some 40 land trusted homeownership projects) and
the Neighborhood Housing Services Program (which sells units to
"unmortgageable" applicants) .9
A second "micro" level feature of Boston's potential first
time buyers that might make Boston loans less risky than similar
loans in other areas concerns the rent-paying capacity of
Boston's lower income renter households. As noted in Chapter 3,
housing expense to income ratios are intended to reflect previous
mortgage loan-paying or rent-paying ability of various
households. One study indicates that the median rent-income
ratio for the metropolitan area of Boston, at 21%, is higher than
in any other city in the nation. When similar ratios are
calculated based on the City of Boston only, rent-income ratios
8(see Appendix IV)
9Conversations with I.C.E. staff and NHS Guide, 1988.
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appear much higher, and it becomes apparent that many moderate
income households currently pay more toward rent than they would
be allowed to pay toward a mortgage under current industry
underwriting guidelines.
As illustrated in Table VII, the ratio of median rents to
median incomes in Boston's neighborhoods is much higher than the
21% ratio similarly calculated for the Boston metro area.10 This
is largely due to the fact that renter households in Boston
neighborhoods have lower incomes than all households in the
Boston metropolitan area. While rent income ratios are
typically calculated by dividing mean or median rents into mean
or median incomes, both of the "ratios of medians" in Table VII
should be viewed cautiously. Because these figures simply
represent the median rent of each neighborhood over median income
in that neighborhood, they do not indicate what any given
household is paying toward rent -- not even the so called
"typical" or median household. However, it is noteworthy to
include these figures for comparison, as the majority of studies
calculate rent income ratios in this manner.
A better estimate of what the typical household currently
pays toward rent can be provided by taking the median of the
10see columns 4 and 5. Advertised rents and hence rent-
income ratios based on these rents are higher than BRA survey
rental payments for two reasons: they do not include subsidized
units, and may tend to reflect cost increases typical upon re-
leasing of apartments.
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TABLE Vil
Three Measures of Housing Expense to Income Ratios In Boston
Neighborhoods, 1988
- 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5 - - 6 -
NPD
W Roxbury
Charlestown
Bck By/Beac
Central
South End
S Boston
Rosi Indale
Mattapan
N Dorch
Roxbury
E Boston
Jamaica PI
Hyae Park
Fenway/Ken
Allston/Brt
S Dorch
Boston
Median
I ncome
Renter
Hsh I ds
28843
23235
41662
38458
24036
10896
21152
18428
14421
14421
14421
14421
22434
20831
24036
18908
19357
Median Median I
Advrt BRA I
Rent, Survey 1
88 Rent I
I
750 451 1
863 443 1
850 794 1
1000 594 1
1
875 482 1
625 398 11
700 562 1
525 519 1
a
700 326 1
625 411 1
688 421 1
800 451 1
1
700 593 1
750 559 1
725 708 1
700 591 1
1
NA 527 1
Advtsd.
Ratio
of
Medians
31.2%
44.6%
24.5%
31 .2%
43.7%
68.8%
39.7%
34.2%
58.2%
52.0%
57.2%
66.6%
37.4%
43.2%
36.2%
44.4%
BRA
Ratio
of
Medians
.8%
.9%
.9%
.5%
24.0%
43.8%
31 .9%
33.8%
27. 1%
34.2%
35.0%
37.5%
.7%
.2%
.3%
.5%
BRA
Median
of
Ratios
22.1 %
22.8%
23.6%
23.9%
24.5%
25.2%
25.9%
26.7%
26.8%
27.0%
27.0%
27.2%
28.2%
29.5%
31.2%
49.9%
Cases
in
Sample
21
34
59
26
56
36
18
62
41
96
53
88
12
68
72
54
NA 32.7% 28.3% 651
Based on BRA 1985 income inf
May or May not include heat,
Includes Heat,
ratio of 2 div
ratio of 3 div
Elect, Water.
ided by 1
ided by 1
lated to 1988 levels.
utilities. Source: BRA, 1988.
BRA Survey Rents Inflated to 1988 $.
6. Median of ratios of all renter households
Source: 1985 BRA Household Survey
1988 BRA Housing Informational Report
Inflator: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Qrtly Economic
Indicators, 1985-1989.
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ratios for all households, illustrated in column 6 of Table VII.
While these median of ratios figures are not consistently
correlated with neighborhood incomes, it does appear that the
typical household in highest income neighborhoods pay less of
their income toward rent than the typical household in low or
median income neighborhoods.
It is also apparent that lower and moderate income
households bear higher rental expense burdens than higher income
households. Table VIII plots rent-income ratios for all Boston's
renter households in the BRA Household Survey sample. While
there is a high degree of variability among all income ranges,
there is also considerable correlation between income levels and
ren-income ratios. At a glance, this scattergram indicates that
very few households with incomes above $32,500 pay more than 30%
of their income toward rent. The moderate income households
delineated by vertical lines have widely dispersed ratios: some
of these households pay as little as 10%, while others pay as
much as 55% of their income toward rent.
Simply put, lower income households tend to pay more of
their income toward rent than higher income households. However,
current underwriting guidelines, with ratios set at 25% or 28%,
appear to reflect the past experience of primarily those with
incomes above $32,500 in Boston, rather than those who, as
demonstrated by the HOP experience, frequently run up against
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TABLE Vill
Rent/Income ratio for Boston Renters
?100
90
80
0.
70
1o 60
50
40
300
C 20
~ 10
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
1988 Annual I ncome (Thousands)
SOURCE: BRA Household Survey, 1985. Rents and Incomes inflated
to 1988 level with the CPI for housing and total CPI for Boston,
respectively, from 1985-1988. Inflator: Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, Qrtrly Economic Indicators.
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these barriers.
This higher rental housing expense appears to hold true for
lower income households of all neighborhoods. Table IX compares
rental expense burdens for three population sectors - those
households with incomes below the target range, those with
incomes in the 17,500-32,500 target range, and those with incomes
above the target range.
With the exception of two neighborhoods (Allston/Brighton
and the South End), less than 10% of the highest income
population group pays greater than 30% of their income toward
rent. Meanwhile, between 20% to 60% of moderate income
households pay over 30%. For the group with lowest incomes,
between 60% and 100% of households (with the exception of
Charlestown households) pay more than 30% of their income toward
rent.
Take the case of Roxbury:
62% of Low Income Households Pay More than 30% rent/income
54% of Moderate Income Households Pay More than 30%
0% of High Income Households Pay More than 30%
This demonstrated ability to pay 30% or more of income toward
rent among lower income households may occur for several reasons:
for lower income households, it is not unlikely that there are
simply no cheaper, suitable alternatives. Alternately, perhaps
these households have little additional debt, making somewhat
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TABLE IX
% Of Household Income Allocated to Rent by Low, Moderate and High Income
Households*, Selected Boston Neighborhoods, 1988**
Neighborhood Income % Paying
Group <25%
% Payin % Payin % Paying I #
>25% >30% >40% 1 Cases
1) East Boston
2) Charlestown
5) Back Bay/
Beacon Hill
6) South End
7) Fenway/
Kenmore
8) Allston/
Brighton
9) Jamaica
Plain
10) Roxbury
12) South
Dorchester
LOW Income
MODERATE Income
HIGH Income
LOW Income
MODERATE Income
HIGH Income
LOW Income
MODERATE Income
HIGH Income
LOW Income
MODERATE Income
HIGH Income
LOW Income
MODERATE Income
HIGH Income
LOW Income
MODERATE Income
HIGH Income
LOW Income
MODERATE Income
HIGH Income
LOW Income
MODERATE Income
HIGH Income
LOW Income
MODERATE Income
HIGH Income
13) Mattapan LOW Income 19% 81%
MODERATE Income 10% 90%
HIGH Income 100% 0%
*LOW INC: < $17,500 MOD INC: b/t $17,500 & $32,500
**Selected Neighborhoods Include those for which a ml
describe at least two of three Income groups.
Income and Rents Calculated by Inflating 1985 BRA S
the Total CPI and Housing CPI, respectively, for Bo
74%
60%
0%
HIGH INC:
58% 1 31
20% 1 10
0% 1 15
> $32,500
nimum of 10 cases
urvey Data with
ston, 1985-1988.
Source: 1985 BRA Household Survey
Federal Reserve Bk of Boston, Quarterly Economic Indicators, 1/85-1/89.
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19%
71%
100%
35%
40%
67%
0%
31%
66%
8%
36%
80%
3%
26%
70%
0%
41%
77%
6%
53%
94%
27%
23%
100%
0%
41%
92%
81%
29%
0%
65%
60%
13%
100%
69%
29%
92%
64%
10%
97%
74%
25%
100%
59%
5%
94%
47%
0%
73%
77%
0%
100%
59%
8%
71%
21%
0%
47%
20%
0%
100%
54%
6%
72%
36%
10%
90%
37%
0%
85%
47%
14%
71%
35%
6%
62%
54%
0%
96%
29%
0%
52% 1
14% 1
0% 1
24% 1
20% 1
0% 1
100%
38%
0%
36% 1
9% 1
0% 1
83% 1
26% 1
5% 1
73% 1
22% 1
5% 1
1
53% 1
12% 1
0% 1
45% 1
8% 1
0% 1
96% 1
12% 1
0% 1
higher housing expenses possible. Some households may place a
higher value on housing than on other necessities, and adjust
their budgets accordingly.
For whatever particular reasons, 1/3 to 1/2 of all moderate
income households have demonstrated an ability and willingness to
devote 30% of their income toward rent. This would imply that
Boston's low and moderate income households are being
inappropriately limited by underwriting ratios which don't allow
them to pay toward a mortgage what they are already paying for
rent. These data also suggest that current underwriting ratios,
set at 25% or 28%, do not accurately reflect riskiness of
mortgage lending in Boston, and that these standards needlessly
eliminate many buyers who would otherwise be considered
creditworthy. Most frequently hit by these standards are the
first-time and moderate income homebuyers who have been the
target of state, federal, and community based homeowernship
projects.
As has been apparent through past risk experience, there is
no "magic" ratio which can limit risk exposure and incidence of
default to a given level. The FHA's allowable ratios of up to
38% have not resulted in higher default rates, and in fact have
experienced fewer defaults than lower ratio loans in recent
years. The objective should not be to establish a uniformly
higher standard for all loan applicants, but rather to choose a
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reasonable higher limit, say in the range of 35%, from which to
make individual decisions based on past rental payment history in
conjunction with other lending criteria.
It is also not a trivial point that high rent expenses are
perceived as eroding a household's ability to save money toward
a downpayment. While higher downpayments are consistently
correlated to higher default rates, the inability to save money
under local economic conditions may limit a household's initial
investment in a home, though not reflect this household's
willingness to save and invest in a home. As an argument for
lowering downpayment requirements, the Massachusetts Affordable
Housing Alliances' Homebuyer's Union, for example, has noted that
housing prices are so high, there is a built-in disincentive to
"walk away from" a home. Hence the Homebuyers Union catch-
phrase, "where would we walk to?". 11
In sum, the Boston market and Boston's moderate income
households are good candidates for more regionally sensitive
underwriting standards. These standards would consider both
macro and micro aspects of Boston's housing market and its
potential homebuyers. In response to restrictive national
underwriting policies (and more generally in response to limited
affordability of HOP units), state agencies and General Electric
Mortgage Insurance Corporation have recently developed several
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lMAHA, 2/89.
initiatives designed to provide an alternative to standard
private mortgage insurance requirements. In addition to programs
which allow slightly higher debt ratios and lower downpayments
and closing costs, the Commonwealth and the City of Boston have
considered additional subsidy levels or alternative methods of
lowering home prices. These policy options being discussed or
implemented offer a good context in which to assess the relative
costs and benfits of amended underwriting standards, the topic of
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5 - ESTIMATED IMPACT OF RECENT HOP INITIATIVES
THE HOP INITIATIVES
Of the six initiatives being implemented or planned under the
MHP Homeownership Opportunity Program, three involve amendments
in standard underwriting guidelines, one involves a direct cash
subsidy, and others pertain primarily to the administrative
processes of marketing HOP units. Both the underwriting changes
and the direct cash subsidy directly change the monthly payment
or up front cash requirements for a given HOP unit, and the
impact of these initiatives can be analyzed quantitatively. The
administrative initiatives primarily address "transactions"
costs associated with getting programatically eligible buyers
through the underwriting review process. Here, the analysis
relies more upon the experiences of HOP developers, the
particular attributes of HOP buyers which affect these
transaction costs, and insights from the past Federal Housing
Authority experience.
After summarizing these initiatives and estimating their
potential impacts on moderate income renter households in Boston,
rough estimates of the costs of these initiatives will be
compared.
1. Borrower's Assistance Program
Under the Borrower's Assistance Program, prospective buyers
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of HOP units who meet income eligibility guidelines but lack the
up-front cash to pay a 5% downpayment and closing costs which
nearly equal that down payment can obtain a second mortgage to
cover closing costs. These non-amortized loans of up to $5,000
or 5% of the purchase price of a home bear a 3% simple interest
rate which, together with the loan principal, is due upon resale
of the HOP unit. BAP has been initially capitalized with $1
million each from the MHFA and MHP and $500,000 from the City of
Boston's PFD and BRA. $1 million of this amount will be
targetted to Boston HOP buyers.
2. Primary Mortgage Insurance Alternatives - the GE/MEFA Self-
Insurance Initiative
This program provides more flexible underwriting standards
through the creation of a shared-risk insurance pool with its own
loan loss reserve fund. The housing expense to income ratio is,
at 30%, slightly more liberal than the old GEMIC ratio of 28%
(and considerably looser than many PMI's restriction at 25% for
down payments under 10%). In late March of 1989, the
Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alliance was still hopeful in
negotiations for increases to 33%.1
The program also reduces the required up-front PMI premium
from 1 1/2% to 1% of the loan value. It should be noted,
lInterview, Tom Callahan.
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however, that this reduction does not represent a decrease in PMI
premium rates, but only in the length of coverage that must be
paid up-front, the remainder being amortized within the cost of
the mortgage.
Finally, the co-insurance program waives requirements to
have two months worth reserve savings for PITI in escrow, thus
also reducing up-front cash requirements by some $1400 - $2000,
depending on the loan's monthly payment amount.
GE Mortgage Insurance Coroporation and MHFA jointly assume
the additional risk of this program through a formula which has
GE pick up the first portion of a claim on a defaulted loan, and
MHFA the second portion of the claim, each in roughly equal
amounts. As first claimant, GE takes the primary position of
risk assumption. 2
3. MHP Unit Cost Write-Down for Boston Non-Profit Projects
With the help of the Massachusetts Affordable Housing
Alliance and the Massachusetts Association of CDCs, MHP has
initiated a Demonstration Program to provide additional HOP
resources for non-profit developers of HOP projects in distressed
urban markets. The rationale behind this program rests in the
fact that certain urban areas, particularly those in which non-
2 MHP HOP Brochure, 2/89, MHFA Newsletter, March 89, and
discussions with HOP Staff.
118
profits have targetted activities, have too soft housing markets
to provide the cross-subsidization of units through a range of
below market and market rate prices. This soft market and a
desire to maintain maximum affordability is reflected in newer
HOP projects such as Fields Corner CDC's Erie-Ellington and
Josephine Street projects, both of which contain 100% HOP units.
As of late March, this pilot demonstration project was still
undergoing final program design. Then-current proposals called
for a $500,000 loan pool, capitalized by a set-aside of HOP
appropriations, to provide "silent second" mortgages. Up to
$10,000 per unit on up to 8 units per development would be
available in order to reduce as many as 50% of the units in HOP
projects to the $70,000 price level. These non-amortized loans
would be payable by the buyer on sale or refinancing, such that
the subsidy would be available to the future HOP unit buyer.
Thus, for the buyer's purposes, this subsidy would basically act
as a unit-cost write down at no cost to the borrower.
In addition to these underwriting changes and a direct price
write down for some HOP units, MHP and the City of Boston have
also implemented initiatives to expedite project approvals and
assist in marketing and mortgaging of HOP buyers. A "small
builders" program, for example, was established to provide a
limited amount of funds in a pilot program to create a "one-stop
shop" for approval processes. Instead of the old two-process
application procedure, which required projects to undergo a
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preliminary MHP approval and a final MHFA approval, only one
approval is required directly by PFD. EOCD and MHFA are also
thinking of developing a regional marketing system similar to one
already in operation on the Cape. The basic idea behind this
planned clearinghouse for pre-screening buyers is, instead of
each development marketing units to essentially the same
population, the City of Boston will have a centralized marketing
service to provide outreach and possibly credit training for
buyers and developers-. 3  Finally, MHP has begun to require more
complete marketing plans at the time of project approval.
Estimated Impact of Proposed Initiatives Under the HOP Program
The following analysis of the impact of various underwriting
and loan term alternatives on the affordability of HOP units is
thus limited to:
1) a 3% and 6% increase in allowable H/I;
2) a 1/2% decrease in up-front mortgage insurance premiums;
3) a waiver of 2 months PITI escrow requirement;
4) a 50% decrease in required down payments and/or closing
costs;
5) a 1% increase or decrease in interest rates;
6) a 10,000 decrease in purchase price;
7) and the more process oriented developer incentives for
project application and homebuyer application processing.
Impacts of HOP Initiatives on the Affordability of Actual HOP
Units
One way in which to estimate the potential impacts of recent
HOP initiatives on unit affordability is to apply these changes
to current actual HOP units which have closed in Boston. It
3HOP Conference, "Marketing HOP Projects", 4/3/89.
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should be noted that a softer condo market and new guidelines
which limit average prices to $75,000 will have a tendency to
both narrow and lower the income range of HOP units in a given
development. Moreover, while some HOP units have closed with 10%
downpayments (primarily in those developments for which PMI was
unattainable), the GE/MHFA self-insurance program will likely
mean that nearly all Boston HOP units will close with 5% down
payments. However, testing these changes against actual HOP
units to date allows the use of other important information on
these units, e.g., the income of actual HOP purchasers, the condo
fees applied, and the appraised value vs sales price of these
HOP units.
Table X applies changes in underwriting terms under the BAP
program and the GE/MHFA co-insurance initiative to Boston HOP
units which had closed as of 2/27/89. The columns compare actual
and hypothetical minimum income and cash requirements before and
after these initiatives for six HOP projects studied in this
thesis. (A seventh, Roxbury Crossing, was not included here due
to insufficient information on buyer incomes).
Of particular note is the fact that actual incomes of HOP
unit buyers are very close to the minimum possible income levels
based on old underwriting guidelines. In all but one project
(Blue Hill Avenue), actual incomes of HOP purchasers were above
92% of the minimum income: Despite trouble reported in finding
mortgageable buyers of the right income range, developers have
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TABLE X
AFFORDABILITY OF UNITS PRODUCED UNDER THE HOP PROGRAM
- 1 - -2- - 3-
ACTUAL AFFORDABILITY I MINIMUM CUR- I MINIMUM PROPOSED
I RENT AFFORD. I AFFORDABILITY
I Under Convt' I Under Revised
Avg. HOP I Underwriting I Underwriting
Afford.* 1 (28% H/I) I (Actual & Proposed)
PROJECT #1 HOP I HOP I GE/MHFA MAHA
CODMAN - DORCH Low I Low I BAP 30% 33%
1) Avg. 3-br = 96000 (5.5%)1 (5.5%) 1 (5.5%) (5.5%) (5.5%)
2) Avg Mtg = 85000 I I
1 I
3) Actual Avg. Inc 28324 1 28842 7 -- 26920 24472
4) Mo. Payment 598 1 598 1 -- 598 598
5) + Condo 75 1 75 1 -- 75 75
6) Cash Requirement 14172 1 14172 1 N.A. 14172 14172
PROJECT #2: HOP I HOP I GE/MHFA MAHA
Bradfd - S DORCH Low I Low I BAP 30% 33%
Avg. 2-br = 89500 (5.5%)l (5.5%) 1 (5.5%) (5.5%) (5.5%)
Avg Mtg = 83900 1 1
1 1
Actual Avg. Inc 29100 1 28286 1 26400 24000
Mo. Payment 585 1 585 1 585 585
+ Condo Fees 75 1 75 1 75 75
Cash Requirement 8985 1 8985 1 2327 8985 8985
1 ;(+ 4174 soft 2nd mtg)
PROJECT #3: HOP I HOP I GE/MHFA MAHA
ROCKVL - J.P. Low I Low I BAP 30% 33%
Avg. 2-br = 86500 (5.5%)l (5.5%) 1 (5.5%) (5.5%) (5.5%)
Avg Mtg = 81700
Actual Avg. Inc 28600 1 25243 1 23560 21418
Mo. Payment 514 1 514 1 514 514
+ Condo Fees 75 1 75 1 75 75
Cash Requirement 8758 1 8758 1 2163 8758 8758
(+ 4104 soft 2nd mtg)
1) Avg. Sales Price for most common HOP unit type in project (e.g., 1-br low
2) Avg Mortgage Assumed by Purchaser of these units
3) Actual Avg Income of Purchaser of these units (col. 1), estimated
Minimums (columns 2 and 3)
4) Mo. Payment (PITI) includes principle and initial HOP interest (5.5%),
Assumes Taxes = .012 x Sales Price/yr, Private mortgage insurance of
1.5%/yr on remaining loan balance. Does not Include property insurance.
5) + Condo Fees. To control for results, the average condo fee was
applied to all projects.
6) 5% or 10% downpayment (except under BAP, 2.5%); $600 attorney fees;
$180 appraisal; $104 Recording fee; $25 Credit Report, 1/2 month's
interest; 3 mo. real estate taxes. 122
TABLE X, p. 2
AFFORDABILITY OF UNITS PRODUCED UNDER THE HOP PROGRAM
ACTUAL AFFORDABILITY I MINIMUM CUR- I MINIMUM PROPOSED
I RENT AFFORD. I AFFORDABILITY
I Under Convt' I Under Revised
Avg. HOP I Underwriting I Underwriting
Afford.* 1 (28% H/I) I (Actual & Proposed)
PROJECT 14: HOP 1 HOP I GE/MHFA MAHA
BLUE HILL - ROX Low I Low I BAP 30% 33%
Avg 2-br Low: 8600 (5.5%)1 (5.5%) 1 (5.5%) (5.5%) (5.5%)
Avg Mtg = 81700 1 1
1 1
Actual Avg. Inc 33000 1 27557 1 25720 23382
Mo. Payment 568 1 568 1 568 568
+ Condo Fees 75 1 75 1 75 75
Down Payment 8881 1 8881 1 2150 8881 8881
11 (+ 4087 soft 2nd mtg)
PROJECT #5: HOP I HOP I GE/MHFA MAHA
SUMNER - N DORCH Low I Low 1 BAP 30% 33%
Avg. 2-br low = 8 (5.5%)l (5.5%) 1 (5.5%) (5.5%) (5.5%)
Avg Mtg = 80800 1 1
I I
Actual Avg. Inc 28800 1 27471 1 25640 23309
Mo. Payment 566 1 566 1 566 566
+ Condo Fees 75 1 75 1 75 75
Down Payment 8625 1 8625 1 2125 8625 8625
1 (+ 4052 soft 2nd mtg)
PROJECT #6: HOP I HOP 1 GE/MHFA MAHA
BOTH - Roxbury Low I Low I BAP 30% 33%
Avg. 2-br = 79500 (5.5%)1 (5.5%) 1 (5.5%) (5.5%) (5.5%)
Avg Mtg = 75500 1
Actual Avg. Inc 26800 1 26143 1 24340 22182
Mo. Payment 535 1 535 1 535 535
+ Condo Fees 75 1 75 1 75 75
Down Payment 8127 1 8127 1 1788 8127 8127
11 (+ 3775 soft 2nd mtg)
Note: For Explanation of Figures, see p. 1 of Table
SOURCE: Massachusetts Housing Partnership HOP Database, Boston Projects
which had closed as of 2/27/89; for condo fees, Project
developers or mktg. agents.
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managed, perhaps only through considerable investment in working
with buyers, to serve affordability to the best of their ability,
given then-current market underwriting guidelines, mortgage
financing costs and price levels. (It should be noted however,
that because these units were for some projects the first several
marketed, they may not be representative of the units which
followed).
As illustrated., the change in allowable housing- expense to
income ratios from 28% to 30% under the GE/MHFA program would
decrease minimum eligible income levels by 6.7%, or roughly $2000
at these unit price levels. A further increase in allowable
housing to expense ratios to 33%, as suggested by the
Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alliance, would reduce minimum
income eligibility by 15.2% below actual minimum levels, or by
over $4000 dollars. However, as previously noted, condo fees and
monthly payment amounts remain constant, with the burden of
higher housing expenses falling largely on the shoulders of the
homebuyer, and indirectly on the mortgage underwriter or investor
who assumes potential added risk.
Also illustrated in Table X are the impacts of the Buyers
Assistance Program (BAP). When closing costs are less than
$5,000 (as in the case of all referenced HOP projects), full
coverage of closing costs, decreases in up-front PMI premiums,
and allowable gift payments of up to $2500 can together reduce up
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front cash requirements to 1/ 4 of their former level, or from
roughly $8800 to $2200 for typical HOP units. Roughly 2/3 of
this reduction is due to the "silent second" mortgage on closing
costs, just under 1/3 to the gift payments, and $400-500 to the
PMI decrease (as note between the difference between up-front
cash plus second mortgage and previous up-front cash
requirement.) This assumes, of course, that buyers can find
someone to provide a gift payment. Without seller concessions or
gifts from family and friends, the up-front cash requirement
would be reduced by about 50% under the BAP program. Moreover,
the BAP program's provision to waive former PMI requirements that
2 months PITI be held in escrow will decreasing savings
requirements by some $1500 per unit (based on double the monthly
PITI expenses).
$10,000 Unit Price Write-Down
The effects of a $10,000 price decrease can also be
illustrated by comparing monthly payments, and income and cash
requirements for the Bradford Estates project and the Back of
the Hill project. The difference in pricing between these two
projects, one selling 2 bedroom HOP units for $85,000 and the
latter for $75,000 are a good reflection of the likely impact of
the recent establishment of a maximum average price for HOP 2
bedroom units of $75,000. In isolation, the $10,000 price
write down would reduce monthly payments by some 8% (50 dollars,
at this price range), down payments by roughly 10%, and minimum
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potential incomes by 8%.
Effects of the HOP Initiatives when Applied to Boston's Renter
Household Population
Up Front Cash Requirements
What little information is available on household savings
has been collected by the MAHA Homebuyers Union through surveys
of 63 of its members. These members, 98% of whom have incomes
within the "target" range of $17,500 to $32,500, are not only
similar to HOP applicants, but in fact many have been HOP
applicants, and make up what has been termed the "lotto losers"
and frustrated buyers of Boston. 4  Under the actual HOP price
and down payments for projects which required 5% down, only 3 of
63, or less than 5%, of MAHA's surveyed members could afford up
front cash requiements in the $8000 range. When those cash
requirements are reduced to $2500, half of MAHA homebuyers
savings would cover these amounts. At 1800, 62% of MAHA
homebuyers qualify.
While there are no data in the BRA Household survey to indicate
the level of savings that moderate income households have
available for a home purchase, the survey did contain a few
questions on whether or not down payments or monthly payments
41nterview with Tom Callahan, Organizer, MAHA Homebuyer's
Union
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were perceived to be a stronger barrier to homeownership. The
81% of Boston households who considered themselves interested in
purchasing a home were all asked these questions, whether they
thought they had a high or low probability of actually purchasing
a home. As might be expected, those who considered themselves
likely to buy a home (those, generally of moderate to higher
incomes) reported down payment most frequently as their main
barrier (see Appendix V). Those who did not consider themselves
at all likely to buy a home quite realistically perceived both
down-payments and monthly paymetns to be a problem. Both BRA and
particularly the MAHA data, in conjunction with developer
surveys, indicate that BAP could increase by severalfold the
number of applicants who meet up front cash requirements for HOP
units.
A $10,000 Price Write-Down, 1% interest rate decrease, and 2%
Increase in Allowable Debt Ratios
It has been noted that at current HOP price levels, the
effects of the given marginal changes in prices, interest rates
and debt ratios are roughly equal. How do all of these
initiatives, taken together, impact the minimum income
eligibility and up front cash requirements under the HOP program?
Table XI displays the actual and potential HOP eligibility
windows under program guidelines prior to fall of 1989, and under
the initiatives which have been implemented, proposed or are
currently under negotiation. The table, which is based on
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estimated 1989 incomes in Boston NPDs, illustrates the maximum
decrease in eligible income levels which could be accomplished by
all changes relevent to monthly housing expenses, that is
initiatives #1-4 listed above (including an increase in allowable
housing expense to income ratio from 28 to 33%). Because the
1989 income distribution employed is an estimate based on 1985
BRA survey incomes and inflated to 1989, these estimates assume
that the population's income distribution has remained unchanged
since 1/85.5
The Table is designed to illustrate 1) the percentage of the
rental population in each NPD reached by the sum affects of
initiatives 1-4 and 2) the position/rank of actual and
potentiallly eligible HOP buyers in relation to the income rages
of the entire population. In the low income neighborhoods which
have hosted HOP projects (including E. Boston, Jamaica Plain,
Roxbury and N. Dorchester), the population of income eligible
buyers under old HOP guidelines and underwriting standards falls
roughly between the 65th and the 85th percentile of the
population income ranks. In Boston's moderate-income HOP
neighborhoods such as Charlestown and the South End, the previous
population of income-eligible buyers falls between the 50th and
65th percentile of all incomes.
5This is not entirely realistic, as there exists
considerable evidence that certain neighborhoods and sub-
neighborhoods in Boston have had considerable in- or out-
migration, and some have experienced fast gentrification within
just the past few years.
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The effect of the 1989 HOP/MHFA initiatives 1-4 is 1) to
lower these rankings of eligible populations to about the 50th
and 40th percentiles within low and moderate neighborhoods,
respectively and 2) to increase the entire eligible population of
many low- and moderate income neighborhoods by 100% or more. In
many low income NPDs, including East Boston, Roxbury, North
Dorchester, and South Dorchester, the initiatives extend
eligibility to an even larger pool of households who fall closer
to the median income households in these NPDs. However, in
certain neighborhoods such as Charlestown, where very few
households have incomes in the $17,500 to $25,000 range, this
"window" of eligibility is only opened to a small percent of the
population.6
COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE SUBSIDY FORMS, AND THE COST OF LOAN DEFAULT
How costly are the risks of increased default? While it is
a relatively simple task to demonstrate the potential benefits of
changes in underwriting standards relative to additional price or
interest subsidies, estimating the costs of these subsidies is a
more complex matter, particularly where the costs of assuming
61n fact, none of survey participants from Charlestown had
incomes that, inflated to 1988 levels, had incomes between
$17,500 and $32,500. Given the relatively small sample size (see
Appendix I, Table II), and normalization due to a single
inflator, this exact percentage is not a reliable exact
estimate.
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additional risk are concerned.
The costs of an additional price write-down, at a proposed
level of $10,000 per unit, is relatively straight forward.
Subsidizing 100 units directly would cost $1 million. If the
price write down took the form of a monthly payment subsidy, its
costs would resemble those of an additional interest rate write
down, where each 1% write down for a period of 10 years at the
$75,000 price level costs roughly $5,000.7
However, calculating the costs of looser underwriting
standards is a much more difficult matter. For one thing, past
literature on underwriting guidelines and associated risk of
default vary widely, with default rates estimated in different
manners, and with study scopes pertaining to different loan
types, geographic areas, and time periods. While down payments
are consistently demonstrated empirically to lead to greater risk
of default, little correlation has been found between higher
debt-income ratios, and both standards, moreover, are known to be
highly dependent upon local economic conditions.
One way in which to approach a cost estimate of the proposed
underwriting changes, without requiring complex risk analysis and
7Net present value of 1% interest on $10,000, declining
balance. Compares to roughly $13,000 for the HOP subsidy which
starts at 3% subsidy (3% below MHFA rates) and falls to 0%
subsidy over 10 years.
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its application to local conditions, is to calculate the number
of mortgage loan defaults which would be required to completely
offset the benefits of the changes themselves. Here, the
benefits are defined in relation to other subsidy forms: for
example, it is known that at HOP price levels, a 3% increase in
allowable H/I ratios would have roughly the same impact on lowest
income eligibility limits as would a $10,000 price write down or
1% interest rate write down. Thus, the question becomes, how
costly is mortgage loan default, and how high would claims have
to rise, in order for these costs to exceed the costs of other
subsidy forms?
Mortgage foreclosure costs vary widely from state to state,
and from loan to loan, depending upon legal systems, foreclosure
laws, and the particular default circumstances which may or may
not require interim property maintanence, title transfer
processes, and eventual advertising and resale of the property.
An estimate of foreclosure costs ranges for MHFA loans, provided
by the Agency, is illustrated in Appendix IV.
For purposes of simplicity, we may base the average cost of
foreclosing a property in Massachusetts on the "rule of thumb"
used by MHFA and PMIs in calculating their loan loss reserve
funds: This rule of thumb states that reserve levels be based
upon the probable default rate, and an estimated average cost for
each foreclosure of 15% of the loan amount. Thus, for HOP units
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the average cost of foreclosing one property might be roughly .15
times $75,000, or $11,250. Based on 100 units, the subsidy
costs are as follows:
$10,000 price reduction: $10,000 x 100 = $1 million
1% interest write down: $5,000 x 100 = $500,000
Thus, given average per-unit foreclosure costs of $11,250,
88 out of 100 mortgages would have to default and foreclose in
order to exceed the costs of a $10,000 outright price reduction
on 100 units. Alternately, 44 out of 100 mortgages would have to
default in order for these underwriting changes to exceed the
cost of a 1% interest rate write down. Again, compared to
current default rates of 3% or less for FHA and PMIs, and even
compared to the high rates of the early 1980's (when 9% of FHA
loans and 3.5% of PMI loans were in default), this increase in
defaults seems highly improbable. As the next section will
indicate, this unlikelihood of extreme increases in default is
especially strong given the compensating factors characterizing
Boston's moderate income buyers and HOP projects.
Summary
The initiatives encapsulated in Table XI indicate that a
large level of potential benefits is likely to result from
changes in underwriting guidelines (benefits comparable to a 1%
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interest rate write down or a $10,000 price ~write down).
Moreover, without these changes, and in absense of large
additional subsidies (e.g. of over $20,000 per unit), it is
apparent that HOP units are unlikely to reach the lower end of
the moderate income household range -- that is, households
earning around $20,000 per year.
However, these initiatives alone cannot guarantee increased
access to households with lower incomes than recent HOP buyers.
rently served under the program. Marketing success, as
demonstrated by interviews with 10 HOP developers in Boston, will
also depend highly on the specific site location of a project,
the marketing strategy of the developer, the degree of community
activism, leadership, representation and outreach in a
particular neighborhood, and not least of all, the
mortgageability of these buyers. The primarly lesson of the HOP
experience is that the act of marketing and concept of
affordability cannot be addressed in isolation from the issue of
mortgageability.
Surveys of HOP project developers indicated that
mortgagability is more than a matter of issues regarding down
payments and debt ratios -- While loosening of ratios will
enhance the mortgagability of all moderate income buyers, and
particularly those at the lower moderate income range, the HOP
experience indicates that a considerable level of commitment in
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time and money will be required to get buyers through current
documentation and credit review processes. This review process
has been quite rigorous for lower income populations who, in
addition to being "borderline" cases with respect to meeting
ratios, are subject to laborious and sometimes impossible
documentation and verification requirements associated with 5%
down loans.
While several banks have been creating self-insurance
programs which decrease documentation requirements (or allow
alternative documents) and expedite underwriting processes on 10%
down loans, the adoption of moee flexible underwriting standards
under the HOP program will, if anything, be likely to generate
increased screening and documentation costs. As Carol Asklund,
underwriting manager for MHFA, notes, in order to consider
compensating factors for lower-income households with smaller
down payments and higher ratios, it is likely that the
transactions costs of screening eligible buyers will be increased
under the new HOP guidelines. These increased costs arise, for
example, in considering a household's previous rent and
installment debt history (and in general, considering alternative
criteria and documentation sources for determining
creditworthiness); in considering the stability of income from
secondary sources and two-income families; in considering the
household's programatic eligibility (as Asklund notes, "we are
underwriting not just on the basis of qualifying for a mortgage
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loan, but also on the basis of meeting program income guidelines
and guidelines requiring that applicants be first time buyers).
More hands-on underwriting processes and increased
transactions costs through more careful screening have also been
notable features of the FHA/VA loan insurance program. Noted
for its more flexible underwriting guidelines, the program has
been able to maintain acceptably low default rates (between 3%
and 4% in recent years) by adopting more careful underwriting
review processes which encourage underwriters to consider a
greater number of underwriting variables as well as any
compensating factors which might offset the increased risk
associated with high LTV, high ratio loans. The FHA/VA
experience suggests that these two policies -- more flexible
underwriting standards and more careful, complete underwriting
reviews -- can be combined under the MHFA/GE self-insurance
program and the HOP Buyers Assistance Program to maintain high
investor standards and low default rates. The FHA experience
also indicates that on balance, increased transactions costs are
not high enough to endanger fiscal solvency, and in the case of
HOP, will not be high enough to offset additional benefits due
from flexible underwriting.
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CONCLUSION
Summary of Findings
This thesis was undertaken to provide an understanding of the
impact of secondary mortgage markets and standardized
underwriting on access to affordable housing in Boston. Boston's
high priced housing market and the experience of developers and
homebuyers under the Commonwealth's Homeownership Opportunity
Program have provided the context for the study.
Chapter 2, The HOP Experience, demonstrated that moderate
income households in Boston's lower income neighborhoods have
been limited in mortgageability both due to initial income and
up-front cash requirements, and subsequently due to the rigorous
documentation and clean "hard copy" credit reports demanded at
loan closing. These households' attributes, including limited
income and wealth, limited credit experience or for that matter
any experience with lending institutions, and dual incomes tends
to subject this group to an already more rigorous underwriting
process than higher income households. Buyers with higher down-
payments often circumvent these requirements because they either
qualify for bank's self-insurance programs or do not require PMI
for sale to the secondary market.
The third chapter reviewed the rise of secondary mortgage
markets, standardized underwriting practices, and the recent
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history of defaults resulting from loans made in the early 80's
which has led to stricter underwriting guidelines in recent
years. As a result of loan losses which were highly specific to
various regions and loan types (e.g., ARMS and GPMs),
Massachusetts has "paid for losses in Houston, Detroit, Dallas,
and elsewhere" by suffering stricter national underwriting
guidelines despite the Commonwealth's very low default record.
While the characteristics of Boston moderate income buyers
provides compensating factors for additional risk inherent -in
higher loan to value and debt to income ratios, the
characteristics of the Boston housing market, including
historically low rates of default and the continued outlook for
appreciating home values, provide compensating regional factors
which should be considered in the application of national of
underwriting standards.
The 4th Chapter focused on underwriting standards in the
Boston market context. The affordable housing crisis has made
underwriting standards a key factor of affordability in recent
years, and at the same time has endowed Boston households with an
ability (or forced need) to support higher rent payments relative
to their incomes. Additionally, the macroeconomic factors
surrounding mortgage lending in Boston appear sound, and the
outlook for demand of affordable housing high. Boston residents,
who have paid a higher proportion of rents than any other city in
the nation, and many of whom pay 25%, 30% or more of their
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incomes toward rent, are good candidates for less restrictive
debt to income ratio guidelines used in underwriting.
Chapter 5 indicated that a 2% increase in housing/income
ratio, a 1% decrease in interest rates or PMI premiums, and a
further cost reduction of $10,000 for the average HOP unit price
would all have similar impacts on the affordability of typical
HOP units. Each of these margins, employed separately, may reduce
HOP buyer incomes some 4000 to 5000 dollars, from the- present-day
average of $28,000 in Boston to a potential minimum of $23,000.
A combination of all three may further reduce affordability
levels to those with incomes of roughly $17,500, thus potentially
reaching a population which more closely aligns the median income
renter household in Boston's lower income neighborhoods.
Finally, chapter 5 indicated that in order for the costs of these
underwriting amendments to reach the level of cost provided by
other policies with similar affordability impacts (e.g., a 1%
interest rate write down or $10,000 price write down), an
astronomically high level of defaults would have to occur.
While more regionally-oriented and buyer specific
underwriting relaxations are highly preferable subsidy forms
given current subsidy structures, the HOP experience also
indicates that many major problems related to mortgageability
cannot be solved by these initiatives alone. It is not just
underwriting standards per se, but the underwriting review
139
process, which limits mortgage availability. This process has
become highly institutionalized, nationalized, and mechanized by
virtue of the secondary market. Even in a basically cooperative
environment as that which occurs under HOP, this
institutionalized lending process has, for a number of reasons,
entailed rigorous, costly and lengthy underwriting reviews.
Under the new MHFA/MHP initiatives, these costs are likely to be
higher due_ to the need to consider and increased number of
underwriting factors, including local and individual compensating
factors, in order to increase access to marginal households while
controlling for highest risk cases among moderate income
households.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The HOP experience and the continued, though perhaps
slightly eased, affordability gap in Boston indicate first and
foremost a need to endogenize the mortgage financing process
within the affordable housing production process. Given today's
high-priced housing market, access to mortgage credit has become
a vital factor of affordability. As mortgage credit tightens and
interest rates rise, the importance of how available mortgage
credit is allocated will be magnified.
The increasing influence of secondary mortgage markets in
determining access to credit by setting national underwriting
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standards must also be considered in designing affordable
homeownership production and financing programs. While some
alternatives to the national secondary market do existl, the
ultimate goal should be to reintegrate affordable housing credit
policies under the domain of the mainstream national secondary
markets. The demonstration co-insurance initiative implemented
by MHFA and GEMIC is certainly one viable way to start a
regionally oriented secondary market. If those changes adopted
under the GE/MHFA plan prove successful in extending
homeownership access to lower income target groups without
excessive increases in defaults, this program will provide a good
model for replicating in the local private lending sphere.
There is already evidence here and elsewhere in the nation
that banks are initiating or considering many first time buyer
and more flexible underwriting programs, and these initiatives
provide the type of commitment among local lenders which could be
used to approach national secondary markets. It is frequently
thought that by route of demonstration with "seasoned" non-
conforming loans (ie, those which have been aged for a few years,
and hence have passed the most crucial stage of default risk),
1For example, the Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation has
provided a secondary market outlet for homes produced under the
Neighborhood Housing Service Programs (Boston has 4 NHSs); and
the Local Initiatives Mortgage Assistance Corporation provides a
similar function for some community based housing projects (LIMAC
has also proposed the securitization of Boston Linkage moneys as
a way of increasing opportunities for higher volumes of lending
activity).
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banks might more successfully broker deals with the FSCAs.
Such demonstration programs, as in the case of one recently
announced by the Bank of Boston, need not necessarily be tied to
a particular housing market or population, but must be sensitive
to the current housing market and mortgageability attributes
facing lower income buyers in targetted areas. For example, in
Boston, it would do little good to target a loan pool to buyers
with incomes under -$30,000 if there exist no housing
opportunities affordable to groups at this income, despite lower
interest rates or more flexible underwriting guidelines.
Moreover, a prime factor in the success of these initiatives will
be associated with documentation and verification processes, ie,
the current underwriting processes which determine criteria for
evaluating the stability of income and soundness of credit
history. At a very minimum, any such initiative, whether geared
toward portfolio lending or sale on the secondary market, must
acknowledge these costs and endogenize them within the affordable
homeownership program, first and foremost by making explicit the
roles of developer, community, bank, local government, and
borrower in the underwriting review process. The
"explicitization" and fine-tuning of mortgage underwriting review
must also entail increased interaction between the borrower and
the underwriter -- not just as an "assist" to the borrower, upon
whom the burden of proof of "ability and willingness to pay"
falls, but as a requisite part of the underwriter's judgement
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concerning the borrower's creditworthiness.
While underwriting review processes are likely to become
more detailed and complex under more flexible guidelines, one
must wonder whether this need be the case. The trend towards
self-insured 10% down loans, and the looser requirements under
these bank-insured loans indicates that alternative criteria for
judging credit histories and income stability might well be
implemented. For example, CitiCorp Mortgage Corporation, as one
of these self-insurers, requires only "soft copy" credit reports
for 10% down loans, rather than "hard copy" reports which can
take several months to correct, if containing an inaccuracy.
Additionally, CitiCorp often waives the typical PMI requirement
for two years of tax returns to verify income, relying instead
upon borrower's paycheck stubs. Renee Beatty, CitiCorp's State
Manager, explains that because borrower equity is considered the
most important factor in determining the soundness of a given
loan, they will make these adjustments for self-insured 10% down
loans.2 In the course of employing a greater variety of risk
assessment factors in underwriting 5% down loans, underwriters
should also consider the appropriateness of alternative criteria
for a specific population group which may, for example, have
little formal credit history or shorter work histories.
While the primary objective of flexible underwriting
2Phone Interview, Renee Beatty, 4/89.
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standards is to increase access to homeownership among lower-
income groups with little initial "wealth" or savings, the point
of underwriting amendments is not to institutionalize uniformly
looser standards. As the present day nationwide underwriting
standards have demonstrated, any uniform standards are likely to
behave differently under different market contexts, and vary in
appropriateness across regions and over time. Rather, the point
is to institutionalize an "ability and willingness" (to use a
pun) of conventional lenders and secondary markets to underwrite,
originate and purchase non-conforming loans. These will include
not just loans with lower down payments and higher ratios, but a
broad and growing array of financing needs for today's
alternative affordable homeownership tenures such as limited
equity coops and land trusted property. Ultimately, it would be
desireable for national secondary market channels to reinstitute
their charter commitment to setting and achieving a target
proportion of lower income loans. Such targets, like the
guidelines they use, must also be regionally based, and should
be coupled with a commitment to accomodate a target percentage of
non-conforming loans in general.
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3/28/89.
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4) INTERVIEWS, cont'd
Grout, Ellen, Office Manager, Sumner Street Development
Corporation (developer of the Sumner Street Townhouses HOP
project), 3/28/89.
Hempschoot, John, Director of Mortgage Standards, Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation, 4/21/89.
Henry, Kevin, Regional Mortgage Insurance Company, 4/22/89.
Joseph, Henry, Habitas Development Corporation, developer of
Brush Hill Commons (formerly Rockvale/Lourdes) HOP project,
4/2/89.
Kerrey, Ann, Boston Housing Partnership. Author of CEDAC study
on housing/income ratios and family budgets, 3/28/89.
Mandolini, Linda, Fields Corner CDC, Project Manager for the
Erie-Ellington HOP project and former Project Manager for the
Robinson Street HOP project, 4/4/89.
Nevine, John, Mortgage Tender Officer, Government National
Mortgage Association, 4/21/89.
Schumann, William, Executive Vice President, Old Republic
Corporation, and President of its Subsidiary, Insured Credit
Services, Inc., 4/21/89.
Sorenson, Frank, Operations Manager, Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency, 4/28/89.
Troy, Joanne, Marketing Agent for Bricklayers Housing Co/Back of
the Hill, developers of the Back of the Hill HOP project,
4/10/89.
Watts, Sylvia, Vice President of Taylor Properties (developer of
the Bradford Estates/Fountain Hill HOP project), 3/30/89.
5. Conferences/Worshops/Meetings
Meeting With Mass Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group, Fleetwood
Bank of New Hampshire, Concord, New Hampshire, 10/88.
Meeting with Mass Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group, Bank of New
England Headquarters, February 28, 1989. Agenda:
Cooperative Housing Finance.
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5. Conferences/Worshops/Meetings, cont'd
Conference on "Secondary Markets and Local Housing Programs: How
To Develop Better Deals", February 9-10, 1989, Arlington, VA,
Sponsored by Community Development Publications.
"EOCD/MHFA Linkage", a Lunchtime Forum Series presentation by
Joseph Flatley, Director, MHP; Marcia Lamb, Asst. Secretary
for Housing; EOCD and Peter Richardson, Director of Policy
Development, EOCD, March 23, 1989.
Conference on "Marketing of Affordable Housing Produced Under the
Commonwealth's Homeownership Opportunities Program",
Sponsored by the Executive Office of Communities and
Development, April 3, 1989, Framingham, MA.
6. Local Studies & Government Publications
Boston Neighborhood Housing Services, "Boston Neighborhood
Housing Services Loan and Construction Policies", 10/87.
Boston Society of Architects Housing Committee, "The Affordable
Housing Challenge - Case Studies of Selected Developments",
July 1988.
Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alliance Homebuyer's Union,
"Locked out of the American Dream: A report on the Bad Dream
for First Time Homebuyers", January 28, 1989.
Nash, Madeline, Dewey, Alexandra, and Curtis, D.J., "An Analysis
of the Buyer Selection and Marketing Practices of the
Homeownership Opportunity Program", prepared for the Amherst
Planning Department and University of MAssachusetts at
Amherst, 2/89.
Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities and Development, "A
Guide to Producing Affordable Housing", 10/87.
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency Newsletter, various issues,
1985-1988.
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, "Home Mortgage Loan
Programs", undated booklet, 1986.
The Massachusetts Housing Partnership, Guidelines for Communites
and Developers, September, 1988.
Massachusetts Housing Partnership, Homeownership Opportunity
Program, undated brochure (issued Spring 1989).
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6. Local Studies & Government Publications, cont'd
Massachusetts Housing Partnership newsletter, "Homeword", various
issues, 1986-1989.
Urban Edge Housing Corporation, Report to Pat Libby from Larry
Braman on "Condo Affordability at Various Interest Rates",
1/20/89.
Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation, Report
from Ann Kerrey and Carl Sussman to the CEDAC Board of
Directors on Homeownership and Shelter Affordability, April
6, 1984.
7. Newspapers and Periodicals
"Nonprofit Groups Lead Housing Drive", Boston Globe, 8/16/87.
"First Time Buyers Locked Out of New House Market", Boston Globe,
9/22/87.
"Mass Homeownership Program Helps Out", Boston Globe, 9/22/87
"Volatile Market Leads Lenders to Tighten Policies", Boston
Globe, 7/5/88.
"Non-Profit Developers Say Lenders Holding Back on Loans", Boston
Globe, 10/29/88.
"Stymied Home Buyers Vent Ire at Obstacles to Ownership", Boston
Globe, 12/19/88.
"Inequities Are Cited in Hub Mortgages", Boston Globe, 1/11/89.
"Redlining Study Vote Expected Today", Boston Herald, 1/12/89.
"Lending Law is Faulted as Largely Ineffective", Boston Globe,
1/11/89.
"Bank Management, Morality Don't Mix", Boston Herald, 1/13/89.
"Hub Fed Had Few Forums On Lending Act", Boston Globe, 1/13/89.
"Representative Fank Warns Fed to Make Public Redlining Study",
The Boston Herald, 1/13/89.
"Expert Hired to Study Bank Lending", Boston Herald, 1/13/89.
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7) Newspapers & Periodicals, cont'd
"The Real Banking Problem In Boston: Minotiry Neighborhoods Have
No Friendly Banker", Boston Globe Editorial, 1/15/89.
"A Tale of Two Cities: Atlanta, A Southern Attack on Skewed
Lending, and Detroit, From Deepest Urban Blight, a
Backlash", Boston Globe, 3/5/89.
"HUB Rents Found Worst In Nation", Boston Globe, 3/18/89.
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APPENDIX I
Neighborhood Data Employed in This Thesis
Data on Rents, Income, homeownership preference, and
obstacles to homeownership were extracted from the 1985 Boston
Redevelopment Authority Household Survey computerized data tapes.
The following description of methodology used in the BRA sample
and in subsequent elimination of "non-valid" cases for the
purposes of this analysis will discuss the advantages,
limitations and level of confidence associated with this
approach.
BRA Household Survey Methodology
Data contained in the BRA Household survey was collected
through a "stratefied two-stage cluster" sampling procedure as
follows:
1) first, Boston's housing units (roughly 1/4 million) were
divided into three groups: BHA public housing units; major new
construction (over 50) units; and all other housing units. It
should be noted that institutional units and homeless individuals
were not included, thus the Household survey does not reflect the
entire Boston population.
2) second, these catagories of housing were divided into
clusters of 25 or more units in a manner which 1) would ensure a
1 in 120 chance of each unit being selected (the chance of a
cluster being chosen times the chance of a unit from that cluster
being chosen = 1/120), and 2) was stratified to ensure that the
number of units chosed from each NSA reflected the proportion of
Boston's population residing in that NSA.
3) after discovering that this method would not provide adequate
cases to reliably describe certain neighborhoods, survey authors
decided to sample some (Mission Hill, Franklin Field) at twice
the rate and one (Allston-Brighton) at half the rate of other
neighborhoods.
4) 300 sample clusters were randomly selected, and an average of
6.7 units from each of these clusters, which ended up yielding an
average of 5 completed surveys in each.
From an initial 2064 households chosen to be surveyed, 229
vacant, non-residential, or group-quarters units were
eliminated. This left 1835 potential households, and an
additional 295 unrelated individuals from whom an in-house
interview was attempted. 1625, or 76.3%, were completed: 1491
with household heads and 224 with unrelated persons.
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Two potential sources of error within this sampling
methodology deserve attention: As a sample of boston's housing
units and their associated households, the survey excludes
persons in dormitories, jails, convents, nursing homes, and other
"group quarters" as well as those with no permanent home.
However, as such persons are unlikely to be first-time homebuyers
in the immediate future, this omission should not present
substantial biases within the context of characterizing
"potential homebuyers" and homeownership demand.
The largest source of error in the BRA Household survey
arises from a 24% non-response rate. While it is impossible to
know exactly how the omission of these households and individuals
biases the survey results, those conducting the surveys report
that "what information is available about non-respondents
indicates that they do not differ systematically and
significantly from respondents except that they are more likely
to live alone, to be white, to be under 65 years old, and to have
no children living with them" - none of which fit traditional
characterizations of first-time homebuyers.
The present study's focus on first-time homebuyers required
subsequent "filtering" of the original 1625 individuals to obtain
those who could be considered potential "first-time homebuyers",
and those for whom suffiencient income and housing expense data
were reported. First, multiple respondents were eliminated from
each household to reduce the unit of analysis to the household,
as it is typically household demographic characteristics which
are used in caluculating mortgage-carrying capacity. (Because
responses for household characteristics were identical among each
interviewee of a household, it made no difference which
respondent was chosen. In this case, the respondent appearing
first on the computerized database was retained).
The total 1399 households were then grouped into owner-occupant,
renter, and "first-time homebuyer" populations. 951, or roughly
2/3s of all survey households were renter households (including
lodgers, roomates, and those living rent free). Of these
renters, just over 75% (772) considered themselves interested in
purchasing a home. This is about 50% of all households (renter
and owner occupied), thus roughly 1/2 of all Boton's households
could be considered potential first time homebuyers.
While this "would be buyer" population best describes first time
homebuyers, after non-respondents to income and rent questions
were excluded, too few cases remained to be reliable. Therefore
the total renter population reporting income and rent (7965
cases, was retained as the sample "first time buyer" population
for rent expense and other analysis used in this thesis.
Frequently, a "target" population of those with incomes between
$17,500 and $32,500 (in 1988 figures, inflating 1984 figures with
the Federal Reserve's CPI for Boston) is referred to.
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A sample population of 50 cases, with a response rate of 80% has
a 95% confidence interval of 12%. This means that chances are
that 95 in 100 surveys will reflect the true mean of the entire
population, plus or minus 12%. Thus, if the mean renter income
were $20,000, the 95% confidence interval would be the range
$17,600 to $22,400. This is an acceptable range for the purposes
of analysis in this thesis. Two of the lower income and HOP
neighborhoods (North Dorchester and Charlestown), and four more
of the non-HOP, moderate or high income neighborhoods contain
fewer than 50 cases. Results for these neighborhoods should be
viewed cautiously. Also, given the 12% confidence interval,
precision of income and rent distribution is limited; however,
these estimates are fine for the purposes of making ordinal
comparisons between neighborhoods.
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APPENDIX I, TABLE A
BRA HOUSEHOLD SURVEY: TOTAL, OWNER, "WOULD BE" BUYER, AND
TOTAL POP
All I Rpt % Rpt
H hid I nc Inc
OWNER POP*
All I Rpt % Rpt
Own Inc Inc
TARGET POPULATIONS
RENTER POP**
All I Rpt % Rpt
Rent inc inc
1. E.Boston
2. Charlestown
3. S.Boston
4. Central
5. BackBay/Beacon
6. South End
7. Fenway/Kenmore
8. Allston/Bright
9. Jamaica Plain
10. Roxbury
11. N Dorchester
12. S Dorchester
13. Mattapan
14. Roslindale
15. W.Roxbury
16. Hyde Park
1399 1
Occupants of condo
renters" I ncludes
175 84%
and 1-4
lodgers,
448
family dwe
roomates,
379 85%
ings
those who live
951 796 84%
rent free
"Rptg Income" Includes lodgers, roommates, excludes those living rent free
"WOULD BE"
BUYER POP***
All I Rpt % Rpt
Buy I ncome Income
TARGET
POPULATION****
I As % of
Tot Pop
1. E.Boston
2. Charlestown
3. S.Boston
4. Central
5. BackBay/Beacon
6. South End
7. Fenway/Kenmore
8. Allston/Bright
9. Jamaica Plain
10. Roxbury
11. N Dorchester
12. S Dorchester
13. Mattapan
14. Roslindale
15. W.Roxbury
16. Hyde Park
BOSTON 772
*** Excludes those who s
651 69%
ay they have no interest in
228 19%
purchasing a home
**** I ncludes Renter Households with Incomes between $17,500 and $32,500.
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83
60
66
61
85
69
86
99
134
135
64
119
131
63
70
74
75
50
50
44
74
63
72
89
112
121
50
95
109
52
59
60
90%
83%
76%
72%
87%
91%
84%
90%
84%
90%
78%
80%
83%
83%
84%
81%
85%
76%
70%
90%
94%
100%
80%
85%
89%
93%
69%
84%
89%
85%
79%
86%
57
39
46
41
69
62
81
79
107
108
51
70
78
23
22
18
93%
87%
78%
63%
86%
90%
84%
91%
82%
89%
80%
77%
79%
78%
95%
67%
BOSTON
* Owner
** "All
90%
84%
78%
65%
87%
92%
89%
92%
85%
88%
77%
79%
79%
84%
95%
69%
21%
20%
12%
5%
30%
29%
25%
34%
18%
19%
18%
18%
19%
15%
8%
5%
APPENDIX I, TABLE B
income Distribution of Boston's Renter Households, 1989 Estimate
TARGET POP
9,999 10,000 17, 500 25, 500 32, 500
or less 17,499 25,499 32,499 39,999
E Boston
Charlestown
S Boston
Central
Bck Bay/Beacn
South E nd
Fenway/Kenmr
Allston/Brtn
Jamaica Plain
Roxbury
N Dorchester
S Dorchester
Mattapan
Rosi Indale
W Roxbury
Hyde Park
Boston
*1989 incomes are
in the 1985 BRA
32%
21%
50%
33%
8%
23%
22%
19%
40%
38%
41%
31%
26%
22%
19%
33%
29%
26%
29%
8%
4%
10%
21%
22%
17%
16%
29%
32%
19%
24%
17%
19%
8%
20%
estimated by
15%
0%
6%
8%
5%
7%
15%
19%
9%
11%
7%
1 9%
13%
22%
0%
17%
11 %
11%
15%
11%
0%
17%
'3%
12%
14%
15%
10%
0%
7%
13%
6%
19%
8%
8%
15%
11%
25%
20%
14%
12%
17%
6%
4%
15%
13%
13%
17%
19%
33%
11% 13%
inflating the incomes o
Housing Survey with the Boston CPI,
40,000 1
+ I
8%
21%
14%
29%
39%
21%
18%
14%
15%
8%
5%
11%
11%
17%
24%
0%
MEDIAN
HSHLD
INCOME,
RENTERS
14421
23235
10896
38458
41662
24036
20831
24036
14421
14421
14421
18908
1 8428
21152
28843
22434
I
CASES
IN
SAMPLE
53
34
36
26
59
56
68
72
88
96
41
54
62
18
21
12
16% 1 19357 1 796
f renter households
1/85-1/89
Source: BRA Household Survey, 1985
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Qtrly Economic indicators, 1/85-1/89.
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APPENDIX 11
MINIMUM INCOME ELIGIBILITY LIMITS FOR AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES
UNDER VARYING INTEREST, UNIT PRICE, LOAN TO VALUE RATIO and HOUSING EXPENSE
CASE 1:110,000
Nominal Interest a 10%1 Nominal Interest = 9%1
Hsg Exp/ Loan-To-Value Ratiol Loan-To-Value
income 0.9 0.95 0.975 1 0.9 0.95
Ratio I
Nominal Interest = 8%
Loan-To-Value Ratio
0.975 1 0.9 0.95 0.975
25%
28%
31%
33%
48,286
43,112
38, 940
36,580
CASE 2:100,000
25% 1 43,896
28% 1 39,193
31% 1 35,400
33% 1 33,255
CASE 3:90,000
25% 1 39,506
28% 1 35,274
31% 1 31,860
33% 1 29,929
CASE 4:80,000
25% 1 35,
28% 1 31,
31% 1i 28,
33% 1 26,
CASE 5:70,
25% 1
28% 1
31% 11
33% 1
117
354
320
604
000
30,727
27,435
24, 780
23,278
CASE 6:60,000
25% 1 26,338
28% 1 23,516
31% 1 21,240
33% 19,953
Source: Author'
insurance at 1
and property
50,675
45, 245
40,867
38,390
46,
41,
37,
34,
068
132
152
900
41,461
37,019
33,436
31,410
36,854
32,906
29, 721
27,920
32,248
28,793
26,006
24,430
27,641
24,679
22, 291
20,940
51,869
46,312
41,830
39,295
47, 154
42,102
38,027
35,723
42,439
37,892
34,225
32, 150
37,
33,
30,
28,
723
681
422
578
33,008
29,471
26,619
25,006
28,292
25, 261
22,816
21,434
s Calculations.
.5% per year, f
44,912
40,100
36,219
34,024
40,829
36,454
32,926
30, 931
36,746
32,809
29,634
27,838
32,663
29,163
26, 341
24,745
28,
25,
23,
21,
580
518
049
652
24,497
21,873
19,756
18,559
47,113
42,066
37,995
35,692
42, 830
38, 241
34, 541
32,447
38,
34,
31,
29,
547
417
087
203
34,264
30,593
27,633
25,958
29,981
26, 769
24, 178
22,713
25,698
22,945
20,724
19,468
Includes Payments
48, 214
43,049
38,883
36,526
43,831
39, 135
35,348
33,205
39,448
35,222
31,813
29,885
35,065
31,308
28,278
26,564
30,682
27,395
24,743
23,244
26, 299
23,481
21,209
19,923
41,538
37,087
33,498
31,468
37,762
33,716
30,453
28,607
33,
30,
27,
25,
985
344
408
747
30,209
26,973
24,362
22, 886
26,433
23,601
21,317
20,025
22,657
20,229
18,272
17,164
for PITI,
43,
38,
35,
32,
552
886
123
994
39, 593
35,351
31,930
29,995
35,634
31,816
28,737
26,995
31,674
28, 281
25,544
23,996
27,715
24,746
22,351
20,996
23,756
21,210
19,158
17, 997
44,559
39,785
35,935
33,757
40,508
36,168
32,668
30,688
36,458
32, 551
29,401
27,619
32,407
28,935
26, 134
24, 551
28,356
25,318
22,868
21,482
24,305
21,701
1 9,601
18, 413
including PMI
ire and hazard insurance of 1% per year,
taxes of 1% of the home value (price).
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APPENDIX 1I, p. 2
MINIMUM INCOME ELIGIBILITY LIMITS FOR AFFORDABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES
UNDER VARYING INTEREST, UNIT PRICE, AND LOAN TO VALUE RATIOS
CASE 1:110K
Nominal Interest = 7%1
Hsg Exp/ Loan-To-Value Ratio I
Income 0.9 0.95 0.975 1
25% 1 38,259 40,091 41,007 1
28% 1 34,160 35,796 36,614 1
31% 1 30,854 32,331 33,070 1
33% 1 28,984 30,372 31,066 1
Nominal Interest = 6%1
Loan-To-Value Ratio I
0.9 0.95
35,123 36,780
31,359 32,840
28,325 29,662
26,608 27,864
Nominal Interest = 5%
Loan-To-Value Ratio
0.975 1 0.9 0.95 0.975
37,609
33,580
30,330
28,492
32,176
28,729
25,949
24,376
33,671
30,063
27, 154
25, 508
34,418
30, 730
27,756
26,074
CASE 2:100K
25% 1 34,781
28% 1 31,054
31% 1 28,049
33% 1 26,349
CASE 5:90K
25% 1 31,303
28% 1 27,949
31% 1 25,244
33% 1 23,714
CASE 4:80K
25% 1 27,825
28% 1 24,843
31% 1 22,439
33% 1 21,079
CASE 5:70K
25% 1 24,347
28% 1 21,738
31% 1 19,634
33% 1 18,444
CASE 6:60K
25% 1 20,868
28% 1 18,633
31% 1 16,829
33% 1 15,809
Source: Author's Calculations.
insurance at 1.5% per year, f
Includes Payments for PITI, including PMI
Ire and hazard insurance of 1% per year,
and property taxes of 1% of the home value (price).
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31,930
28,509
25,750
24,189
28,737
25,658
23, 175
21,770
33,437
29,854
26,965
25, 331
30,093
26, 869
24,269
22,798
26,749
23,883
21,572
20,265
36,446
32, 541
29,392
27,611
32, 802
29,287
26,453
24,850
29, 157
26,033
23,514
22,089
25,512
22,779
20,575
19,328
21.,868
19,525
17,635
16,567
37,279
33,285
30,064
28,242
33, 551
29,957
27,057
25,418
29,823
26,628
24,051
22, 593
26,095
23,300
21,045
19, 769
22,368
19,971
18,038
16,945
25,
22,
20,
19,
544
807
600
351
34,190
30,527
27,573
25,902
30, 771
27,474
24,816
23,312
27,352
24,422
22,058
20, 721
23,933
21,369
19,301
18,131
20,51 4
18,316
16,544
15,541
31,289
27,936
25,233
23,704
28, 160
25, 143
22,710
21,333
25,031
22,349
20,186
18,963
21,902
19,556
17,663
16,593
29, 251
26,117
23,590
22, 160
26,326
23,505
21,231
19,944
23,401
20, 894
18,872
17,728
20,476
18,282
16,513
15,512
17,551
15,670
14,154
13,296
30,610
27,330
24,685
23, 189
27,549
24,597
22,217
20,870
24,488
21,864
19,748
18,551
21,427
19,131
1 7,280
16,232
18,366
16, 398
14,811
13,913
22,351
19,956
18,025
16,932
23,
20,
18,
17,
406
898
876
732
19,
17,
15,
14,
158
105
450
513
20,062
17,913
16,179
15, 199
18,
16,
15,
14,
773
762
140
222
APPENDIX III
TYPICAL UP-FRONT CASH REQUIREMENTS
FOR A SINGLE-FAMILY CONDOMINIUM WITH LOAN TO V
10%
Down Payment (x price)
3 Mo. Real Estate Taxes (X price)
FACTOR:
Points (x mortgage)
1 yr. PMI Premium (x mortgage)
1/2 Mo. Prepaid Interest (x mtg)
Title Insur. (x mtg)
FACTOR:
Appraisal ((fixed)
Credit Rpt (fixed)
Secondary Mkt. Fee (fixed)
Legal (fixed)
Recording (fixed)
0.100
0.003
0.103
0.020
0.015
0.003
0.001
0-039
180
25
60
600
104
ALUE < .80
5%
0.05
0.003
0.053
0.020
0.015
0.004
0.001
0.040
180
25
60
600
104
TOTAL:
FIXED DOLLARS:
+ Factor 1 x price
+ Factor 2 x mortgage
969
0.103
0.039
969
0.053
0.040
(+ 1 MONTHS CONDO FEES)
Source: Urban Edge Housing Corporation, Confirmed by PFD and MHFA.
Compares slightly lower than conventional single family homes, where
no condo fees pertain, prepaid fire and hazard insurance is added, and
legal, appraisal and credit report fees may be slightly higher.
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APPENDIX IV
Estimated Foreclosure Costs Per Dwelling
MHFA Residential Mortgage Loan Foreclosures
Time To Take Title: 12-15 months
(Loss of Interest & Premium) N.A.
Legal Fees $1,000
Real Estate Taxes $8,000-12,000
Fire & Hazard Insurance Premiums $400-500
Clean Up, Repair, Maintanance $0 - $5,000
Sales Cost (Real Estate Broker, Advert) N.A.
--- -------------------------------------------------------------
"Rule of Thumb" and Loan Loss Reserve Factor: 15% of loan amount
*Factor Based on 8.5% interest, 30 yr maturity. Does not include
Taxes or Insurance.
Source: Rough Estimates Provided by MHFA
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APPENDIX V
MAJOR BARRIERS TO HOMEOWNERSHIP CITED BY BOSTON'S POTENTIAL HOMEBUYERS*
Those Not At All
Likely To Buy
Down Mo.
Pymt Pymt
E.Boston
Charlestown
S.Boston
Central
BackBay/Beacon
South End
Fenway/Kenmore
Allston/Brighton
Jamaica Plain
Roxbury
N Dorchester
S Dorchester
Mattapan
Rosl Indale
W.Roxbury
Hyde Park
12%
10%
6%
11%
27%
35%
24%
30%
13%
16%
19%
18%
14%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
11%
0%
15%
10%
9%
3%
4%
0%
0%
3%
0%
0%
0%
*lncludes Renter Households with
See Appendix 1, Table A.
Those Very or Fairly
Likely To Buy
Both
88%
90%
94%
78%
73%
50%
67%
61%
83%
80%
81%
82%
83%
100%
100%
100%
Down Mo.
Pymt Pymt
40%
46%
50%
63%
58%
74%
35%
29%
40%
47%
60%
57%
48%
60%
86%
20%
20%
8%
25%
38%
15%
0%
17%
18%
24%
13%
0%
10%
13%
10%
0%
20%
Both
40%
46%
25%
0%
27%
26%
48%
54%
36%
41%
40%
33%
39%
30%
14%
60%
an interest In owning.
Source: 1985 BRA Household Survey
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
